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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
 
 
PART 1 
This paper provides evidence on the timing of earnings management behavior for initial 
public offering (IPO) firms in the annual periods surrounding the offering.  It also 
examines whether this behavior is related to CEO and CFO trading after the offering.  
Using discretionary accruals as my proxy for earnings management, I find that, for firms 
that file a new 10-K before the trading restrictions provided in underwriter lockup 
agreements end, average IPO-firm discretionary accruals are significantly positive in the 
first 10-K filed after the offering, and that these discretionary accruals are significantly 
larger than those in the offering prospectus.  I also find a positive relation between CEO 
and CFO trading activity and discretionary accruals for the same group of companies.  
Taken together, the results suggest that earnings management behavior is more prevalent 
in the first 10-K filed than in the offering prospectus, that it is concentrated in the firms 
that file this 10-K before their lockup period expires, and that it is positively related to 
CEO and CFO trading after the offering. 
 
 
 
PART 2 
This paper examines whether earnings management behavior has decreased in the period 
following the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) for IPO firms.  It also 
explores how any changes I observe for IPOs relate to any changes that have occurred for 
the broader set of public companies.  I find that IPO firms have experienced a significant 
decrease in earnings management after the passage of SOX.  The results also provide 
evidence that this decrease is driven by the smallest public companies.  While pre-SOX 
discretionary accruals for IPO firms are larger than those for non-IPO firms, I find that 
the post-SOX decrease in discretionary accruals results in the level of IPO-firm 
discretionary accruals becoming indistinguishable from that of non-IPO firms.  Finally, 
the evidence suggests that the characteristics of post-SOX offerings are different from 
those of pre-SOX offerings, and that the decrease in discretionary accruals in the post-
SOX period remains after controlling for these changes. 
 v
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GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
 1
GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
 
 
 Previous research documents that managers record income-increasing adjustments 
to earnings around the time that companies go public.  Some papers document this 
earnings management behavior in the prospectus financial statements before the offering, 
while other studies document this behavior in the first financial statements filed after the 
offering.  Managing earnings before the initial public offering (IPO) might lead to the 
company receiving higher proceeds from the offering than the company would have 
received without managing earnings. 
Earnings management in the period following the IPO might occur for a number 
of reasons.  One such motive is that insiders typically do not sell their shares in the 
offering.  Instead, they enter into agreements with underwriters in which the insiders 
commit to holding their shares at least until a specified time following the offering.  
Increasing earnings in the financial statements publicly available when insiders begin to 
sell their interests could have a positive impact on the share price at the time they sell, 
thus increasing the proceeds they personally receive from these transactions. 
 In Part 1 of this dissertation, I examine IPO-firm earnings management behavior 
around the time of the offering.  I hypothesize that one of the above motivations will 
override the other and, as a result, I will be able to detect significant differences in 
earnings management in one of the two periods surrounding the offering.  I also test 
whether insider trading after the offering is related to income increasing earnings 
management in the annual financial statements available at the time the share sales occur. 
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 In Part 2 of this dissertation, I examine whether recent regulations have affected 
IPO-firm earnings management.  The Securities Act of 1933 (the ’33 Act) imposes stiff 
penalties for wrongdoing in a securities offering setting.  In spite of these consequences, 
previous research suggests that earnings management occurs around these offerings.  On 
July 30, 2002, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) was signed into law.  While SOX 
does not directly affect the ’33 Act provisions, it does increase the penalties for certain 
corporate malfeasance for all companies.  Because the specific motivations discussed 
above exist in the IPO setting, it is important that we understand the effects of increased 
potential liability on firms with these motivations.  Thus, Part 2 explores whether I 
observe a change in IPO-firm earnings management in the post-SOX regulatory 
environment.  The study also examines whether IPO companies respond the same as or 
differently from non-IPO companies. 
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PART 1: LOCKUPS, INSIDER SALES, AND THE TIMING OF IPO-FIRM 
EARNINGS MANAGEMENT 
 4
1. INTRODUCTION 
 An initial public offering (IPO) presents the management of a private company 
with, among other things, the opportunity to finance current operations and future 
growth.  This process also provides the owners of these firms with a market in which they 
can sell their ownership interests.  Obviously, it is in the best interests of these parties to 
maximize the value they receive for the shares sold in the offering.  On the other hand, 
potential investors do not possess the same information set as the managers and owners, 
and these investors do not want to overpay for the shares they purchase.  To help bridge 
this information gap, the Securities Act of 1933 (the ’33 Act) generally requires 
companies to prepare a registration statement that they file with the SEC and to 
disseminate a preliminary prospectus (commonly referred to as a “red herring”) to 
potential investors to aid the investors in making an investment decision with respect to 
the offering.  These documents, however, do not eliminate the information advantage that 
company insiders possess.  More importantly, “obvious entrepreneurial incentives for 
misrepresentation prevent outsiders from believing the unsupported claims of 
entrepreneurs” in the offering (Downes and Heinkel 1982, 1). 
 Empirical evidence suggests that IPO companies might act in a manner that is 
consistent with this incentive.  Friedlan (1994); DuCharme, Malatesta, and Sefcik (2001); 
DuCharme, Malatesta, and Sefcik (2004); Teoh, Welch, and Wong (1998); and Teoh, 
Wong, and Rao (1998) document income-increasing discretionary accruals around the 
time of IPOs.  These accruals have been positively associated with the offering proceeds 
(DuCharme, Malatesta, and Sefcik 2001), negatively associated with post-IPO market 
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performance (DuCharme, Malatesta, and Sefcik 2001; DuCharme, Malatesta, and Sefcik 
2004; Teoh, Welch, and Wong 1998; Teoh, Wong, and Rao 1998), negatively associated 
with post-IPO operating performance (Teoh, Wong, and Rao 1998), and positively 
associated with the probability of shareholder lawsuits and the settlement of these 
lawsuits (DuCharme, Malatesta, and Sefcik 2004). 
 For IPOs before 1998, Standard & Poor’s did not generally capture pre-IPO 
financial data from the prospectus in its Compustat database.1  As a result, the authors of 
previous large-sample earnings management studies in the IPO context use financial 
statement data from the first 10-K filed after the IPO (referred to as the IPO-year 
financial statements) to compute discretionary accruals.2,3  The argument for the 
reasonableness of using IPO-year discretionary accruals is that the incentive to manage 
earnings is likely to remain for several months following the offering.  These incentives 
include pressure to meet verbal earnings projections communicated during road shows, 
pressure from underwriters to meet their analysts’ earnings projections, and the expiration 
of underwriter lockup agreements (Teoh, Welch, and Wong 1998; Teoh, Wong, and Rao 
1998).  While the incentives to meet earnings projections and analyst forecasts are likely 
to persist into the future, the lockup typically expires 180 days after the offering. 
                                                 
1 Through discussions with Standard & Poor’s representatives, I confirmed that they began to backfill pre-
IPO data during 1998 as long as the pre-IPO period contains at least nine months of operations. 
2 One exception to this statement is Venkataraman, Weber, and Willenborg (2005) who examine IPO-firm 
discretionary accruals in both the pre- and post-IPO periods. 
3 DuCharme, Malatesta, and Sefcik (2004); Teoh, Welch, and Wong (1998); and Teoh, Wong, and Rao 
(1998) use IPO-year financial data because the use of the financial statements that were available at the 
time of the offering would have required them to hand collect data from prospectuses for sample sizes of 
more than 3,500, 1,600, and 1,600 companies, respectively.  Contrast these sample sizes with those of 
DuCharme, Malatesta, and Sefcik (2001) and Friedlan (1994) who use pre-IPO financial data that they 
hand collect from prospectuses for 171 and 155 companies, respectively. 
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Underwriter lockups are agreements between the lead underwriter and company 
insiders.  While they are not required by the securities laws, these agreements restrict 
insiders from selling their shares until a specified point in time.  Upon lockup expiration, 
insiders are typically free to begin trading the shares they own in the company subject to 
certain volume restrictions.  As a result, the earnings management effects of lockups (i.e., 
recording positive accruals in the period before insiders plan to sell their shares) are not 
likely to remain long after the lockups expire.  To the extent that managers plan to sell 
stock after the lockup period ends, they can use accounting discretion to boost earnings 
until they liquidate their shares.  Once the insiders sell the shares they wish to sell, this 
lockup-related, insider selling motivation for increasing earnings would disappear. 
While managers have the incentive to increase earnings right before they sell 
shares, another possibility is that managers wish to increase the offering proceeds to the 
company, which would provide more cash to finance its business.  Increased pre-IPO 
earnings might help the company support a higher offering price (DuCharme, Malatesta, 
and Sefcik 2001; Ritter 1984).  However, the increased liability exposure for IPO firms 
and their auditors under the ’33 Act might counteract these incentives (Venkataraman, 
Weber, and Willenborg 2005). 
Thus, the timing of the incentive to manage earnings in the offering is somewhat 
ambiguous.  On one hand, the insider selling argument suggests that managers would use 
accounting discretion in the financial statements that would be publicly available at the 
time they plan to sell their shares.  These sales typically do not occur until after the 
lockup agreement expires sometime after the offering.  On the other hand, increasing the 
proceeds to the company in the offering would require increasing earnings in the 
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financial statements available in the prospectus, but the increased liability potential for 
these firms and their auditors might constrain this behavior in the pre-IPO period. 
In this study, I examine earnings management behavior around the time of IPOs 
to explore whether, on average, IPO-firm managers use larger positive earnings 
adjustments (1) to boost offering proceeds or (2) to increase the amount they receive from 
selling shares soon after the offering.  I examine this issue by comparing pre- and post-
IPO discretionary accruals for different groups of companies and different time periods 
depending on whether the company’s lockup period ends before or after the company 
files its first 10-K.  The results suggest that the companies that file a 10-K before the 
lockup period expires exhibit more earnings management behavior in those 10-K 
financial statements as compared to the prospectus financial statements.  This suggests 
that managers increase discretionary accruals in the 10-K financial statements publicly 
available when they anticipate selling their shares after the lockup expires. 
To test this assertion, I examine the relation between post-lockup IPO-firm insider 
trades and discretionary accruals in the annual financial statements from the period before 
the trading is allowed to occur.  The trading analyses support this claim; that is, I observe 
a significantly positive relation between the proportion of CEO and CFO shares traded 
following the lockup period expiration and discretionary accruals, and this relation is 
limited to the firms that file a new 10-K before the lockup period expires.  Taken 
together, the results suggest that earnings management behavior is more prevalent in the 
first 10-K filed than in the offering prospectus, that it is concentrated in the firms that file 
this 10-K before their lockup period expires, and that it is related to insider trading.  The 
results of this study help to further develop our understanding of the incentives to manage 
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earnings around the time of IPOs, and this evidence might be of interest to regulators and 
IPO investors as it can help these parties to identify the specific period around the 
offering in which IPO-firm managers’ attempts to increase earnings are most likely to 
have affected the financial statements. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 provides background and 
develops the hypotheses.  Section 3 discusses the research design.  I provide the results of 
the main analyses in Section 4, and I test the sensitivity of these results in Section 5.  
Section 6 concludes with a summary. 
 
2. BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESES 
Earnings Management to Increase the Offering Price 
Typically, the primary motivation for going public is for the company to raise 
capital and to create a market in which its owners can liquidate their holdings at a later 
date (Ritter and Welch 2002).  Given that no public market exists prior to the offering, an 
offering price must be determined before the company goes public.  The price for the 
shares issued in the offering is determined through negotiations between the company 
and its underwriters.  Empirical evidence suggests that earnings are a significant 
determinant of initial IPO value (DuCharme, Malatesta, and Sefcik 2001; Ritter 1984).  
Thus, the issuer selling securities has a strong financial incentive to increase pre-issuance 
earnings and, thereby, maximize its share price at the time of issuance. 
The discretion available to managers under U.S. GAAP offers them the ability to 
decide between relatively conservative or aggressive applications of accounting 
principles.  Furthermore, for fiscal years that began prior to December 15, 2005, APB 20 
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provided accountants for IPO firms with a unique opportunity to retroactively change 
accounting methods without the normal reporting requirements.  Instead of requiring 
companies to report the cumulative effect of a change in accounting principles as a 
separate item in the calculation of net income, APB 20 allowed IPO-firm managers to 
change accounting principles by simply retroactively restating all pre-issuance financial 
statements (APB 1971, paragraph 29).4  As a result, IPO-firm managers not only have the 
incentive to make positive adjustments to earnings in order to maximize the share 
issuance price, but they also had the ability to do so because of the unique IPO 
accounting rules that do not require the normal disclosure of a change in accounting 
methods. 
Neill and Pourciau (1995) study the association between IPO proceeds and 
accounting choice and find evidence that firms receiving higher offering proceeds choose 
income-increasing inventory costing and depreciation methods.  Note that these decisions 
are not necessarily problematic because the managers are choosing from among GAAP 
accounting methods. 
Other studies examine the prevalence of earnings management behavior around 
the time of the offering by estimating discretionary accruals.  Using hand-collected data 
from IPO prospectuses, Friedlan (1994) finds income-increasing discretionary accruals in 
the financial statements issued closest to but before the offering date.  His results provide 
                                                 
4 Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 154, Accounting Changes and Error Corrections, 
supersedes APB Opinion 20 for accounting changes and error corrections that occur in fiscal years 
beginning after December 15, 2005.  This new standard does not include the exemption allowing offering 
firms to retroactively restate prior periods without the normal reporting requirements of a change in 
accounting principle. 
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evidence that managers exercise discretion in order to report a larger income number 
around the time of the IPO. 
In order for inflated earnings to affect the offering price, however, investors must 
be unable to detect that manipulation has occurred.  Identification of these positive 
adjustments would enable investors to reverse the excessive accruals and to more 
accurately value the shares.  DuCharme, Malatesta, and Sefcik (2001) provide evidence 
that, after controlling for cash flows from operations, pre-IPO accruals (both 
discretionary and non-discretionary) are positively associated with the initial value of the 
IPO.5  These results suggest that total accounting earnings have incremental explanatory 
power above cash flows in an IPO-valuation setting. 
While incentives exist for management to increase the offering proceeds by 
recording positive accruals in the pre-IPO financial statements, the increased liability 
exposure for IPO firms and their auditors under the ’33 Act might counteract these 
incentives.  Consistent with this argument, Venkataraman, Weber, and Willenborg (2005) 
document significantly negative pre-IPO discretionary accruals, on average, which they 
attribute to improved audit quality under the ’33 Act litigation regime. 
Underwriter Lockup Agreements 
 While lockup agreements are not required by law, they are common in the IPO 
setting.  These agreements, which typically have a 180-day term, are between lead 
underwriters and IPO insiders who agree to refrain from selling their shares until the 
lockup expires.  Underwriters require lockup agreements to ensure that management 
                                                 
5 Similar to Friedlan (1994), DuCharme, Malatesta, and Sefcik (2001) hand collect financial data from IPO 
prospectuses for their sample. 
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continues to have the same ownership interest in the company in the months immediately 
following the offering and also to help support the price of the IPO.  Because the 
agreement is between underwriters and insiders, the underwriters have the freedom to 
release shares from the lockup at their discretion.  Companies disclose the terms of the 
lockup provision in the registration statement and in the prospectus. 
It is not uncommon for lockups to cover a substantial proportion of the post-IPO 
shares held by the public, and this proportion is frequently greater than 100 percent of the 
publicly traded shares (Bradley et al. 2001).  As a result, the expiration of the lockup 
period followed by insider sales can have a large impact on the number of publicly traded 
shares for newly-public companies.  After the unlock date, however, insiders are limited 
in the number of shares they can each individually trade.  Rule 144 promulgated under 
the ’33 Act provides insiders with a mechanism to register the previously unregistered 
shares they hold.  While the provisions of this rule are relatively straightforward, it limits 
the number of shares that an individual insider can sell in any three-month period to the 
greater of one percent of the shares outstanding or the average weekly trading volume 
during the four calendar weeks preceding the filing of his or her notification of intent to 
sell the shares on Form 144.  Nevertheless, the expiration of the lockup enables insiders 
to liquidate some portion of their holdings publicly for the first time. 
Bradley et al. (2001) document average unlock-day abnormal returns of -0.74 
percent and a -1.61 percent abnormal return during the five-day window surrounding the 
lockup expiration date, which appear to be concentrated in firms with venture capital 
backing.  Similarly, Field and Hanka (2001) find a -1.5 percent abnormal return during 
the three-day period surrounding the lockup expiration date, which they partially attribute 
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to downward sloping demand curves and larger-than-expected insider selling.  They also 
provide evidence of a permanent 40 percent increase in trading volume.  Brav and 
Gompers (2003) report similar evidence with respect to returns and volume.  Thus, the 
expiration of the lockup agreement represents a shift in the nature of trading soon after 
the offering. 
Brav and Gompers (2003) test three potential explanations for the presence of 
lockups in the IPO setting.  The first possible explanation is that insiders agree to lockup 
their shares for a longer period of time as a signal of firm quality.  The second 
explanation is that lockups serve as a commitment device to help overcome information 
asymmetry, and firms with a larger moral hazard problem are more likely to agree to a 
longer lockup period.  The final possibility they examine is whether underwriters use 
lockups to extract additional compensation from the company by requiring that the lead 
underwriter be the market maker for pre-lockup sales or by receiving additional fees for 
underwriting a formal seasoned equity offering (SEO).  Brav and Gompers’ (2003) 
results support the explanation that lockups serve as commitment devices; that is, longer 
lockups are associated with companies that are more likely to suffer from information 
asymmetry as a result of moral hazard.  Furthermore, they find that underwriters of firms 
with lower incentives for moral hazard are more likely to let insiders at these firms sell 
shares before the lockup expires.6 
                                                 
6 Fifteen percent of the IPOs in the Brav and Gompers (2003) sample report share sales prior to the end of 
the lockup period.  The average (median) number of insider transactions for this subset of companies was 
six (two), and these sales represented an average (median) proportion of 5.2 percent (0.8 percent) of shares 
subject to the lockup agreement. 
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Earnings Management Subsequent to the IPO 
The association between the information environment and lockups documented 
by Brav and Gompers (2003) suggests that insiders might have the opportunity to manage 
earnings without outsiders knowing about it.  In order for earnings management to occur, 
however, the incentive to do so must be present.  As Brav and Gompers (2003, 26 
footnote 21) argue “because insiders sell little of their holdings at the IPO and are 
restricted from selling until after the lockup expires, engaging in earnings management 
prior to the release is clearly in their self interest.”  Successfully increasing the price of 
the shares sold, however, would require the stock price to reflect the information 
contained in accruals. 
Subramanyam (1996) demonstrates that the market prices discretionary accruals, 
and Sloan (1996) reports that stock prices fail to account for the lower persistence of the 
accrual component of earnings relative to the cash flow component of earnings.  Xie 
(2001) extends these studies and concludes that the market overprices discretionary 
accruals.  Finally, Beneish and Vargus (2002) find that income-increasing accruals drive 
accrual mispricing.  Thus, it appears as though insiders planning to sell shares after the 
lockup expires can affect the stock price by engaging in earnings management during the 
period before the lockup expires. 
A number of studies document significantly positive discretionary accruals in 
IPO-year financial statements.  DuCharme, Malatesta, and Sefcik (2004); Teoh, Welch, 
and Wong (1998); and Teoh, Wong, and Rao (1998) document that, on average, IPO-year 
discretionary accruals are significantly positive.  Teoh, Welch, and Wong (1998) and 
Teoh, Wong, and Rao (1998) also illustrate that, along with earnings, abnormal accruals 
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decrease over the years subsequent to the IPO suggesting that managers increase IPO-
year earnings to a level that is not sustainable in the future.  Teoh, Welch, and Wong 
(1998) find that firms with higher levels of IPO-year discretionary accruals experience 
worse post-issuance stock market performance than IPO firms with lower levels of 
discretionary accruals.  Finally, DuCharme, Malatesta, and Sefcik (2004) document a 
negative relation between discretionary accruals and post-issue returns, a positive relation 
between the lower post-issue returns and an increased probability of shareholder lawsuits, 
and a positive association between discretionary accruals (in absolute dollars) and lawsuit 
settlements (in absolute dollars).  DuCharme, Malatesta, and Sefcik (2004, 47) conclude 
that “this evidence strongly supports the opportunism hypothesis.”  Furthermore, these 
results also provide evidence that, in the context of IPOs, discretionary accrual models 
detect behavior that can result in an increased probability of litigation against the firm. 
IPO Earnings Management Timing 
For years prior to 1998, Standard & Poor’s did not capture pre-IPO financial data 
in its Compustat database.  As a result, the studies with larger samples of IPOs (i.e., 
DuCharme, Malatesta, and Sefcik 2004; Teoh, Welch, and Wong 1998; Teoh, Wong, and 
Rao 1998) measure discretionary accruals using IPO-year financial statement data.  The 
argument in favor of using IPO-year accruals is that the incentive to manage earnings is 
likely to remain into the months following the offering.  These incentives include 
pressure to meet verbal earnings projections communicated during road shows, pressure 
from underwriters to meet their analysts’ earnings projections, and the expiration of 
underwriter lockup agreements (Teoh, Welch, and Wong 1998; Teoh, Wong, and Rao 
1998). 
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In terms of the potential explanations above, the lockup-related motivation seems 
like the most logical reason that the incentive to manage earnings extends into the periods 
following the IPO.  While it is not possible to measure the verbal earnings projections 
communicated during road shows, it is also conceivable that these companies will issue 
earnings projections into the future and that the motivation to meet these projections is 
not unique to the post-IPO period.  In addition, the pressure to meet analysts’ forecasts is 
likely to persist into the future.  The lockup expiration, however, typically occurs within 
180 days of the offering.  The lockup expiration presents the first opportunity for IPO 
insiders to publicly sell their shares.  If these insiders wish to increase the share price at 
the time of their sales, one way to do so would be through income-increasing 
discretionary accruals because the market misprices discretionary accruals (Xie 2001) 
and accrual mispricing is concentrated in income-increasing accruals (Beneish and 
Vargus 2002). 
On the other hand, Friedlan (1994) and DuCharme, Malatesta, and Sefcik (2001) 
document positive discretionary accruals in the period preceding the IPO.  More recently, 
however, Venkataraman, Weber, and Willenborg (2005) find negative discretionary 
accruals during the pre-IPO period, which they argue is consistent with auditor 
conservatism.  They also document that these pre-IPO discretionary accruals are 
significantly less than those from the post-IPO period, and that post-IPO performance-
adjusted discretionary accruals are significantly positive.  I build on their analyses by 
proposing that the expiration of the lockup results in higher discretionary accruals 
following the offering. 
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Not all companies go public during the same part of their fiscal year.  As a result, 
Rule 3-12 of Regulation S-X governs the period of the financial statements required to be 
included in the prospectus depending on the expected IPO date.  Because the lockup 
expiration date depends on the offering date, the period of the financial statements 
publicly available at the time the lockup period expires also depend on the offering date.  
For companies that file a 10-K after the offering but before the lockup expires, the 
publicly available financial statements before the IPO are different from the publicly 
available financial statements before the lockup expires.  Therefore, it is possible to test 
whether, on average, IPO companies act on the incentive to manage earnings to increase 
the offering proceeds or the incentive to manage earnings to increase the share price 
around the time of the lockup expiration.  With respect to the difference in discretionary 
accruals between the pre-IPO period and the pre-lockup-expiration period, my formal 
hypothesis stated in its alternative form is as follows: 
H1a: For the companies that file a 10-K before the lockup period expires, the 
level of discretionary accruals included in the last annual financial 
statements before the IPO is significantly different from the level of 
discretionary accruals included in the annual financial statements publicly 
available at the time that the lockup expires. 
 
Underwriters do not require all companies to have lockup arrangements in 
connection with an IPO.  Furthermore, not all companies will file annual financial 
statements between the time of their IPO and the expiration of a lockup agreement.  For 
example, Hotels.com went public on February 20, 2000, and the company’s insiders 
agreed to a 180-day lockup agreement with its lead underwriter, Donaldson, Lufkin & 
Jenrette.  The company’s final prospectus included financial statements as of and for the 
period ended December 31, 1999, and the company did not file its 10-K with its 
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December 31, 2000 financial statements until April 2, 2001, well after the August 23, 
2000 lockup period expired.  As a result, the pre-IPO and the pre-lockup-expiration 
financial statements for Hotels.com are the same.  See Figure 1 for a timeline of these 
events.7 
 Previous IPO research that measures discretionary accruals in the IPO year treats 
the following companies the same way: (1) companies without a lockup, (2) companies 
similar to Hotels.com that do not file a 10-K until after the lockup expiration, and (3) 
companies with lockup agreements that file a 10-K before the lockup period expires.  
That is, they measure discretionary accruals for these IPO-firm groups at the same point 
in time relative to the IPO – the IPO year.  If the lockup expiration is the reason in favor 
of measuring discretionary accruals in the IPO year, however, measuring the accruals for 
groups (1) and (2) above during that period is problematic because there is no lockup for 
group (1) and the IPO-year financial statements are not public until after the lockup 
expires for group (2).  As a result, the relative strength of the motivation to manage 
earnings in each of the different periods becomes irrelevant because the pre-IPO financial 
statements are the same as those publicly available before the lockup expires.  This line 
of reasoning would suggest that discretionary accruals would be significantly higher in 
the pre-IPO period than those in the IPO year for both of these groups of companies. 
On the other hand, the ’33 Act applies to the pre-IPO financial statements, and the 
increased potential costs of misstating financial statements in this period might outweigh 
the benefits of managing earnings before the lockup expires.  Furthermore, Venkataram, 
Weber, and Willenborg (2005) find that IPO firms record income-decreasing 
                                                 
7 All Tables and Figures for Part 1 are included under the heading Part 1: Appendix. 
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discretionary accruals in the pre-IPO period due to conservatism.  Thus, I am unable to 
predict a sign for the difference in discretionary accruals between the pre-IPO year and 
the IPO year for this group of companies.  My formal hypothesis stated in the alternative 
form for the firms with IPO-year financial statements that are not public until after the 
lockup expires is as follows: 
H1b: For the companies that file their first 10-K after the lockup period expires, 
the level of discretionary accruals included in the last annual financial 
statements before the IPO is significantly different from the level of 
discretionary accruals included in the first annual financial statements filed 
after the IPO.8 
 
Post-Lockup Trading and Earnings Management 
 The argument that managers have the incentive to manage earnings before the 
expiration of the lockup period assumes that the amount of insider selling is significant 
enough to entice managers to manage earnings prior to the lockup expiration.  As a result, 
I examine whether the level of discretionary accruals depends on the amount of insider 
trading that occurs subsequent to the lockup expiration. 
 Previous research documents a relation between earnings management and insider 
trading.  Beneish (1999) finds that managers in firms subject to SEC enforcement actions 
for earnings overstatements are more likely than control firms to have sold shares or to 
have exercised stock appreciation rights during the period in which earnings were 
overstated.  He also provides evidence that these overstatements mislead investors and 
delay drops in share prices and, therefore, that overstatement-firm managers profit from 
their sales.  Beneish does note, however, that the results of his study apply to companies 
                                                 
8 All of the sample firms have a lockup agreement.  As a result, I do not include a formal hypothesis for the 
firms without a lockup agreement. 
 19
that the SEC has prosecuted, which hampers the ability to generalize the results to all 
insider sales that follow earnings manipulation. 
 Other studies examine the relation between insider trading and accruals using a 
broader sample of companies.  Beneish and Vargus (2002) examine whether insider 
trading contains information about earnings quality.  Their results suggest that, when 
insider selling accompanies income-increasing accruals, the persistence of these accruals 
is significantly lower than when insider buying accompanies income-increasing accruals.  
Based on further testing to explore whether opportunistic earnings management or 
changes in the economic environment in which these companies operate drive their 
results, Beneish and Vargus (2002) conclude that their findings can be at least partially 
explained by opportunistic earnings management.  Park and Park (2004) find similar 
results with respect to the association between insider sales and earnings management, 
and they also provide evidence that this result is robust to controlling for the possibility 
that managers decide to sell after their companies report abnormally high accruals. 
 The results in the IPO setting are similar to those for other public companies.  
Darrough and Rangan (2005) document a negative relation between managerial selling 
and the change in R&D expenditures for a sample of R&D intensive IPO firms.  They 
interpret this result as suggesting that managers believe that investors fixate on earnings 
and, therefore, borrow from the future benefits of R&D to increase IPO-year earnings.  In 
addition, they document a positive relation between IPO-year discretionary accruals and 
managerial selling for their sample. 
Darrough and Rangan’s (2005) sample includes 243 firms that went public 
between 1986 and 1990.  Because their research question focuses on earnings 
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management through a specific expense, R&D, rather than overall earnings, the authors 
eliminate any companies that had zero R&D expenditures.  This requirement results in 
the loss of 375 IPOs from their sample.  As a result, the ability to generalize their results 
for the association between managerial trading and discretionary accruals to a broader set 
of IPO firms is unclear.  To build on Darrough and Rangan’s (2005) results, I test 
whether the level of discretionary accruals before the lockup expires is positively 
associated with the proportion of shares that managers sell subsequent to the expiration of 
the lockup agreement.  My formal hypothesis that addresses this question is stated in the 
alternative form as follows: 
H2: There is a positive relation between managerial selling after the lockup 
expires and the level of discretionary accruals included in the annual 
financial statements publicly available at the time that the lockup expires. 
 
3. RESEARCH DESIGN 
The Discretionary Accruals Model, Heteroskedasticity, and Scaling 
I use a modified version of the Jones (1991) model to estimate discretionary 
accruals, my proxy for earnings management.  This model estimates non-discretionary 
accruals using the cross-sectional method outlined in DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994) and 
an accounts receivable adjustment as outlined in DeFond and Park (1997).  The model 
suggests that the expected level of accruals is a function of cash-basis revenues (i.e., the 
change in revenues adjusted for the change in accounts receivable) and the level of 
property, plant, and equipment: 
,)( 210 iiiii PPEARSalesTACC εααα ++∆−∆+=      (1) 
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where i is a firm subscript, TACC equals total accruals (i.e., the difference between some 
measure of income and cash flows), ii ARSales ∆−∆ equals the year-over-year change in 
cash-basis revenues, and equals the level of gross property, plant, and equipment.  
The model includes the change in cash-basis sales to measure the expected level of 
working capital accruals, which is expected to change as revenues change, and the level 
of property, plant, and equipment to measure the expected depreciation component of 
accruals. 
PPE
Accruals result from timing differences between when companies recognize 
revenue and when the cash actually changes hands.  As companies grow, transaction 
volume increases.  The number and magnitude of potential timing differences increase as 
transaction volume increases.  Therefore, the variation in total accruals is likely to 
increase with company growth and size.  As a result, the Jones (1991) model suffers from 
heteroskedasticity, a violation of the OLS assumption that the variance of the residuals is 
constant.  This violation leads to inefficient, but unbiased OLS coefficient estimates. 
The widely accepted form of the model used in prior literature weights each 
variable by lagged total assets (see e.g., Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney 1995; DeFond and 
Jiambalvo 1994; Jones 1991; Kasznik 1999; Klein 2002; Kothari, Leone, and Wasley 
2005) as a control for heteroskedasticity.  Furthermore, this heteroskedasticity is assumed 
to be proportional to lagged total assets squared,  (see Jones 1991, footnote 33).  Thus, 
, and the standard deviation of .  Weighting each 
variable in equation (1) by the inverse of  corrects for heteroskedasticity of this 
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specific functional form.  One can then estimate the following transformed equation via 
OLS: 
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Note that this is equivalent to running WLS and defining the weight such that each 
observation is weighted by the inverse of lagged assets.  In equation (2),  
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Thus WLS fixes the heteroskedasticity problem when the heteroskedasticity is 
proportional to lagged assets. 
 To assess how well WLS addresses the heteroskedasticity problem, I estimate 
discretionary accruals using both OLS and WLS.  After each industry regression for each 
year, I perform White’s (1980) heteroskedasticity test.  I then compare the results from 
White’s (1980) test for the OLS models with those from the WLS model. 
Another potential issue with the discretionary accruals model is scaling.  Barth 
and Kallapur (1996, 530) argue that running a cross-sectional model using financial data 
can be problematic if the research question must be answered “after controlling for scale 
differences” and the model does not control for these scaling differences.  The problem in 
the context of the discretionary accruals model is that the observed variables (TACC, 
, and PPE) actually include a scale factor, Si, which I assume to have a 
multiplicative effect for purposes of illustration.  The equivalent version of equation (1) 
that reflects this scaling effect is as follows: 
ii ARSales ∆−∆
.**)(** iiiiiiiii eScPPESARSalesbSaSTACC ++∆−∆+=    (4) 
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This equation parallels equation (2) from Barth and Kallapur (1996, 531).  Note that the 
original constant term in this equation, a, is multiplied by the scale variable, Si.  As Barth 
and Kallapur (1996) highlight, however, the scale variable, Si, is frequently not 
observable.  Thus, the following equation remains: 
.*** iiiiiii uSPPEcSSalesbaSTACC +′+∆′+′=      (5) 
Notice that in equation (5) a′  represents the intercept term, while in equation (4) the 
intercept term, a, is multiplied by the scaling factor, Si.  As a result, equation (5) omits a 
relevant variable that is correlated with the other variables in the model.  This correlated 
omitted variables problem results in biased coefficients. 
If the scaling factor were known and observable, researchers could simply 
multiply each of the variables in equation (4) by the inverse of the scaling factor.  As 
discussed above, however, this scaling factor is frequently not observable.  This problem 
presents researchers with the need to select a proxy variable to measure Si that can be 
used (1) to deflate the observed variables or (2) as a scale-related control variable in the 
model.  Barth and Kallapur (1996) use simulations to test the effects of using proxy 
variables along with these two alternative solutions.9  In terms of reducing coefficient 
bias, Barth and Kallapur (1996) find that including a scale proxy as a control variable is 
more effective than deflation using the same scale proxy. 
The modified-Jones model deflates all the variables in the equation by total assets 
at the beginning of the period to control for heteroskedasticity because she finds the 
                                                 
9 Barth and Kallapur (1996) examine the scaling effects of estimating the relation between the market value 
of equity and earnings, not the scaling effects of estimating the Jones (1991) model.  Given that researchers 
use financial data that is not purged of the actual scale effect to estimate the Jones (1991) model, however, 
it is reasonable to generalize the Barth and Kallapur (1996) results to the discretionary accrual estimation 
process. 
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squared residuals from the unscaled model [equation (1) above] to be highly correlated 
with squared lagged assets.  Although the reason for scaling is to address a 
heteroskedasticity problem, this method also addresses the scale issue.  While scaling by 
lagged total assets controls for heteroskedasticity when the variance of the residual is 
proportional to squared lagged assets, it is not clear whether lagged assets is the true scale 
factor.  If lagged assets do not represent the true scaling factor, the Barth and Kallapur 
(1996) results suggest that including lagged assets as a scale proxy in equation (1) and 
not scaling any of the variables has the potential to reduce bias and increase the 
efficiency of the results. 
In my main analyses, I estimate discretionary accruals in a manner consistent with 
the prior literature (i.e., using WLS).  I also estimate discretionary accruals using the OLS 
estimator on a model that includes lagged assets as a scale proxy in the regression 
without dividing through by lagged assets, and I discuss these results in Section 5.  The 
next section discusses the discretionary accrual estimation process in more detail. 
Discretionary Accruals Estimation 
 I calculate total accruals for all Compustat firms using equation (2) from Hribar 
and Collins (2002, 109) as follows: 
,,,, tjtjtj CFOPSEBXITACC −=        (6) 
where j and t are firm and time subscripts, respectively, and TACC equals total accruals, 
EBXI equals income before extraordinary items from the statement of cash flows 
(DATA123), and CFOPS equals net cash flows from operating activities adjusted for 
extraordinary items and discontinued operations (DATA308 – DATA124). 
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As discussed above, I estimate non-discretionary accruals using the cross-
sectional method outlined in DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994) and an accounts receivable 
adjustment as outlined in DeFond and Park (1997).  This method groups all companies 
with sufficient Compustat data with other companies from the same two-digit SIC code 
in the years in which earnings management is hypothesized and estimates non-
discretionary accruals using the following equation:10,11 
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where j and t are firm and time subscripts, respectively, and TACC equals total accruals 
from equation (6), A equals total assets (DATA6), Sales∆ equals the change in revenues 
(DATA12) from the prior period, AR∆ equals the change in receivables (DATA2) from 
the prior period, and PPE equals the level of gross property, plant, and equipment 
(DATA7).12  I estimate the model for industries with at least 20 observations. 
Discretionary accruals for the sample firms are then calculated using the estimates 
from equation (7): 
                                                 
10 Two-digit SIC codes group old- and new-economy firms together.  To subdivide companies into old- 
and new-economy groups, I use the new-economy definitions from Murphy (2003).  This affects the two-
digit SIC code groups listed below.  Companies in the four-digit SIC code groups included in parentheses 
are considered new-economy companies, while all other four-digit SIC code groups are not. The affected 
groups are as follows: 35 (3570, 3571, 3572, 3576, and 3577), 36 (3661 and 3674), 48 (4812 and 4813), 50 
(5045), 59 (5961), and 73 (7370, 7371, 7372, and 7373). 
11 I follow Kothari, Leone, and Wasley (2005) and add an additional constant term to this equation.  
Kennedy (2003) argues that including an additional constant in a WLS model can help to control for 
potential omitted variables bias and that inclusion of this additional constant does not create additional bias.  
Note that this is equivalent to including lagged assets in the base model before dividing through by lagged 
assets.  Thus, this model is actually somewhat of a hybrid between a WLS model and a model that controls 
for scale by using a scale proxy. 
12 Following Teoh, Welch, and Wong (1998) and Teoh, Wong, and Rao (1998), I estimate equation (2) by 
excluding all sample firms and all firms that conducted an SEO in the respective year from the estimation 
sample.  Given that Compustat now includes pre-IPO data, I also exclude IPO companies during the pre-
IPO period. 
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where j and t are firm and time subscripts, respectively, and DA equals discretionary 
accruals and each  represents the industry-specific coefficient estimated from equation 
(7).  Thus, DAj,t is basically the residual from equation (7). 
βˆ
 Finally, I adjust the discretionary accruals calculated in equation (8) using a 
portfolio approach employed in prior literature (e.g., Ashbaugh, LaFond, and Mayhew 
2003; Kasznik 1999; and Klein 2002).  Kothari, Leone, and Wasley (2005) demonstrate 
that adjusting for the discretionary accruals of similarly performing firms can correct for 
the misspecification of discretionary accrual models previously documented for 
companies with extreme performance (see e.g., Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney 1995).  I 
adjust for performance by first assigning the sample companies to a return on sales (ROS) 
decile.  Each decile contains firms from the same industry with sufficient Compustat data 
to calculate discretionary accruals and ROS.  I create the deciles by sorting the firms in 
each industry based on their ROS value in a given year and assigning them each to one of 
10 groups based on their ROS ranking.  Finally, I calculate the median discretionary 
accruals for each decile (excluding the sample companies), and I subtract this value from 
the sample firms’ discretionary accrual estimate.  While Kothari, Leone, and Wasley 
(2005) use return on assets (ROA) to measure performance, I use ROS because, as Teoh, 
Wong, and Rao (1998) highlight, ROA in the IPO year should be lower because the IPO 
proceeds would immediately increase assets, whereas IPO proceeds are less likely to 
have an immediate impact on sales.  The performance adjusted discretionary accrual is 
calculated as follows: 
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,, ,, tDecileROStjtj MedianDADAPADA −=       (9) 
where j and t are firm and time subscripts, respectively, and PADA equals performance-
adjusted discretionary accruals, DAj,t equals discretionary accruals calculated using 
equation (8) for the sample firm, and MedianDAROS Decile,t equals the median discretionary 
accrual for the given ROS decile. 
Sample Selection 
Table 1 provides an outline of the sample selection process.  The sample of IPO 
firms comes from the Securities Data Corporation (SDC) New Issues Database, which 
includes firm-commitment IPOs.  I include companies that completed common stock 
IPOs during the period between January 1, 2000 and the signing of SOX on July 30, 
2002.  The sample excludes ADRs, REITs (SIC code 6798), partnerships, closed-end 
funds, unit offers, financial institutions (SIC codes 6000-6199), and insurance companies 
(SIC codes 6300-6411).  I exclude financial institutions and insurance companies because 
the accrual composition for these firms is unique to these industries.  These restrictions 
result in 459 IPOs.  I further restrict the sample to include firms with sufficient financial 
data available on the 2004 Compustat Industrial, Full Coverage, and Research files.  I 
then merge this sample with the CRSP Daily Stock File.  Ninety-five companies are 
missing data necessary to estimate discretionary accruals, 21 companies report zero 
revenues (which results in these companies having an undefined ROS measure), 20 are 
missing other financial data needed to calculate the control variables, four companies 
come from two-digit SIC codes with fewer than 20 companies, and four companies are 
missing from Compustat. 
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Using the SEC’s EDGAR database, I hand collect the date of the last annual 
financial statements included in the prospectus, the date that each sample company files 
its first 10-K, whether or not a lockup agreement exists, and the length of the lockup 
agreement.13  EDGAR is missing one or both of the filings for nine companies.  Finally, I 
exclude eight firms because they have discretionary accrual values greater than (less 
than) the 99th (1st) percentile and were not excluded for other reasons.  The final sample 
used to test H1 includes 298 IPOs. 
For the insider trading analysis, I gather the trading data from Table 1 of the 
Thomson Financial Insiders database.  Table 1 includes the common stock transactions of 
insiders reported on SEC Form 4, which includes any changes in insider ownership.  
Before the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) in July 2002, Section 16 of the ’33 
Act required the Form 4 to be filed within 10 days following the end of each calendar 
month.  Section 403 of SOX, however, amended this requirement so that the Form 4 now 
must be filed within two days of the transaction execution. 
Tests of IPO Earnings Management Timing 
The sample used to test H1 is a balanced two-period panel of data in which each 
of the 298 sample companies is included in the analysis twice.  The data for the first firm-
year observation comes from the last annual financial statements included in the IPO 
prospectus, and the data for the second firm-year observation comes from the first 10-K 
the company files.  I use the following model to test H1: 
                                                 
13 While SDC provides lockup-related data, it is often incorrect.  Of the 298 sample firms, for example, 
SDC identified 138 firms as not having a lockup agreement.  An examination of the prospectuses for these 
firms, however, identified the existence of a lockup agreement for all of these companies. 
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where firm and time subscripts are omitted for expositional convenience. 
The dependent variable, PADA, is the performance-adjusted discretionary accrual 
estimate from equation (9).  POST equals “1” if the data for the firm-year observation 
comes from the IPO year, and “0” if the data for the firm-year observation comes from 
the last annual period included in the offering prospectus.  PRELOCK, a measure of 
whether or not the company provides new annual financial data to the market before the 
lockup agreement expires, equals “1” if the company files its first 10-K before its lockup 
agreement expires, and “0” otherwise.  I use data from the SDC New Issues Database and 
the offering prospectus to determine when the lockup period expires.  I then search 
EDGAR to determine the date of the last annual financial statements included in the 
prospectus and the date that the company filed its first 10-K.  I then determine whether 
the 10-K filing date occurred before or after the lockup expiration. 
H1a examines whether managers of IPO firms that file their first 10-K before the 
lockup expiration tend to act on the incentive to manage earnings before the offering or 
the incentive to manage earnings before the lockup expires.  I test this hypothesis using a 
joint significance test that 031 =+ ββ  in equation (10).  A significantly positive 
(negative) effect would suggest that PADA in the IPO-year is significantly higher (lower) 
than PADA in the pre-IPO year for this group of companies.  H1b explores whether IPO 
companies that file their first 10-K after the lockup expires exhibit more earnings 
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management behavior in the pre-IPO or post-IPO financial statements.  A statistically 
significant coefficient on  in equation (10) would provide support for H1b. 1β
The control variables in equation (10) include factors commonly controlled for in 
recent earnings management studies (e.g., Ashbaugh, LaFond, and Mayhew 2003; Butler, 
Leone, and Willenborg 2004; Menon and Williams 2004).  AUDITOR equals “1” if 
Compustat (DATA149) indicates the presence of a Big N auditor for the firm-year, and 
“0” otherwise.  CFO represents cash flows from operations (DATA308) at the end of the 
period scaled by total assets (DATA6) at the end of the period.  SIZE equals the natural 
log of market value, where pre-IPO period market value is measured using the price and 
number of shares outstanding as of the first day of trading from the CRSP Daily Stock 
file, and equity market value in the IPO year is the share price multiplied by the number 
of shares outstanding (DATA199*DATA25) at the end of the post-IPO period.  MKTBK 
is the equity market value divided by the book value of assets (DATA6) at the end of the 
period.  LEV is total debt (DATA9+DATA34) divided by total assets (DATA6), all at the 
end of the period.  FCOND is Zmijewski’s (1984) financial condition index, which 
controls for financial distress.14  LOSS equals “1” if the company had a net loss 
(DATA172) during the period, and “0” otherwise.  I also include time control indicator 
variables, TimeControls, to control for possible systematic differences in discretionary 
accruals during each period. 
                                                 
14 This measure is a Z-statistic that is calculated using the following variables and coefficient estimates that 
Zmijewski (1984) obtained by using a weighted exogenous sample maximum likelihood method to 
estimate his probit model: 
LIABS)*(CASSTS/C.*(LEV)-.A)*(EBXI.-. 1045/638034 +− , 
where EBXI, A, and LEV are measured as previously defined, and CASSTS equals total current assets 
(DATA4) and CLIABS equals total current liabilities (DATA5), all measured at the end of the period. 
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Tests of Post-Lockup Trading and Earnings Management 
Examining discretionary accruals before the lockup expires assumes that the 
amount of insider selling is significant enough to entice the insiders to manage earnings 
prior to the lockup expiration.  H2 predicts that managerial selling after the lockup 
expires is positively related to the level of discretionary accruals in the annual financial 
statements available when the lockup expires.  To test this hypothesis I run a modified 
version of equation (10) for the sample companies, and I use data from the last annual 
financial statements available at the time the lockup expires.  I replace the POST variable 
from equation (10) with SALES as follows: 
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The SALES variable captures the number of post-lockup expiration shares that the CEO 
and CFO trade as a proportion of the total number of shares outstanding after the 
offering.  The numerator of the SALES variable captures the number of CEO and CFO 
shares traded during the three month period beginning on the day the lockup expires.  I 
calculate this amount by summing each CEO and CFO common stock sale contained in 
Table 1 of the Thomson Financial Insiders database.  The denominator of the SALES 
variable, total post-IPO shares outstanding, comes from the CRSP Daily Stock File.  I 
expect to find a positive relation between post-lockup expiration insider selling and pre-
lockup expiration discretionary accruals, and I include the interaction between 
PRELOCK and SALES to allow the relation between SALES and PADA to differ for firms 
that file a 10-K before the lockup period expiration and those that do not. 
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4. RESULTS 
Sample Description 
Table 2 presents the distribution of sample firms by year.  The vast majority of the 
sample (216 companies) went public during 2000.  Forty-nine companies completed an 
IPO in 2001, and 33 companies went public between January 1, 2002 and July 30, 2002.  
In terms of the date of the financial statement data included in the prospectuses, 193 
prospectuses include 1999 data, 64 prospectuses include 2000 data, 39 include 2001 data, 
and 2 include 2002 data. 
Table 3 shows a cross tabulation between the length of the lockup period and 
whether the company filed a 10-K before the lockup expires.  Approximately 96 percent 
of the sample firms (286/298) have a 180-day lockup period, while seven have a 90-day 
lockup period.  The sample includes one firm in each of the 360-, 365-, and 720-day 
lockup period groups, and two firms in the 540-day group.  Finally, a total of 59 sample 
companies (approximately 20 percent) filed their first 10-K prior to the lockup expiration. 
Table 4 includes the variable definitions and Table 5 presents descriptive statistics 
for the control variables.  Virtually all of the sample companies have a Big N auditor in 
both the pre- and post-IPO periods.  On average, cash flows from operations represent     
-21 percent of assets before the offering, which improves to negative eight percent after 
the IPO.  The median market value after the first day of trading is $453.9 million, and the 
median market value at the end of the IPO year is $326.5 million.  The median market to 
book ratio is 12 and 2.14 for these respective periods.  Total debt represents 31 percent of 
assets in the prospectus financial statements, and 10 percent of assets at the end of the 
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IPO year, and the average probability of bankruptcy is low.  Finally, 73 percent and 69 
percent of the sample had a net loss in the pre- and post-IPO periods, respectively. 
Univariate Tests of IPO Earnings Management Timing 
 Univariate tests provide some evidence of differences in discretionary accruals 
between the pre- and post-IPO periods.  Table 6 provides the means and medians for 
discretionary accruals categorized by the POST and PRELOCK variables.  The t-tests 
provide evidence that overall average pre-IPO discretionary accruals are not significantly 
different from zero, but that average pre-IPO discretionary accruals are significantly 
positive for the firms that file a 10-K before the expiration of the lockup period (p < 
0.05).  These tests also provide evidence that, on average, IPO-year discretionary accruals 
are significantly positive (p < 0.01), and that these positive discretionary accruals occur 
for both groups of PRELOCK firms.  The results in terms of medians are generally 
consistent with those from the t-tests except that median IPO-year discretionary accruals 
for companies that file a 10-K after the expiration of the lockup period are not 
significantly different from zero. 
 Table 7 provides tests for differences in mean (median) discretionary accruals 
between the pre- and post-IPO periods based on paired t-tests (sign tests).  The t-test 
results suggest that average discretionary accruals in the post-IPO period are significantly 
larger than those in the pre-IPO period (p < 0.01).  The sign test results provide similar 
evidence for the medians (p < 0.05).  The tests also suggest that, for the companies that 
file a 10-K before their lockup period ends, average and median discretionary accruals in 
the post-IPO period are significantly larger than those from the pre-IPO period (p < 0.01 
and p < 0.05, respectively), evidence in support of H1a.  While the t-tests provide 
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evidence in favor of H1b (p < 0.01), I fail to find a significant difference in median 
discretionary accruals between the two periods for companies that file a 10-K after their 
lockup period ends (p > 0.10).  Thus, the univariate results for H1b are mixed.  While the 
tests above provide evidence in favor of H1a and some support for H1b, these tests do not 
control for the potential correlation between the test variables and other determinants of 
discretionary accruals.  Therefore, these results should be interpreted with caution. 
Univariate Tests of Post-Lockup Trading and Earnings Management 
 The tests of H2 examine the relation between post-lockup expiration CEO and 
CFO trading and earnings management behavior in the pre-trading financial statements.  
Figure 2 provides some insights into CEO and CFO trading patterns (in terms of the 
number of shares sold) in the months following the offering.  First, trading activity 
appears to spike in month seven.  This is consistent with 96 percent of the sample firms 
having a 180-day lockup period that would expire at the end of month six, which enables 
insiders to begin selling in month seven.15  Second, these insiders sell very few shares 
prior to the lockup expiration.  Finally, while Figure 2 does show that the average level of 
trading increases following the lockup expiration, the average number of shares sold in 
the other months with spikes (i.e., months 11 and 14) is around half of the average 
number shares sold during month 7.  This suggests that CEO and CFO selling in the 
month that the lockup expires is much larger, on average, than typical CEO and CFO 
monthly post-lockup selling. 
                                                 
15 While Figure 2 shows the highest spike in month 17 for the mean number of shares sold, this spike is due 
to one firm with month 17 share sales of approximately 7.5 million shares.  After excluding this one 
observation, the average number of shares sold drops from approximately 30,000 shares to 4,800 shares for 
month 17. 
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Table 8 provides summary statistics on CEO and CFO trading activity that occurs 
during the three months following the lockup expiration.  The mean CEO and CFO 
shares sold as a proportion of total shares outstanding is 0.134 percent for all firms, and is 
0.555 percent for the subset of sample companies with trading activity.  Twenty-four 
percent (72/298) of the sample firms have CEO or CFO trading during this period, and 
the maximum percentage of shares sold during this period is approximately five percent.  
The 24 percent of sample firms with post-lockup expiration CEO and CFO trading that I 
observe is consistent with the 23 percent insider trading rate that Cao, Field, and Hanka 
(2004) document. 
 Table 9 categorizes discretionary accruals for each company by whether or not 
CEO and CFO trading occurs during the three month post-lockup period, and whether the 
pre-trading financial statement data comes from the prospectus (i.e., PRELOCK = 0) or 
the first 10-K (i.e., PRELOCK = 1).  The overall t-test results suggest that the mean 
discretionary accruals for the firms that trade and the firms that do not trade are 
significantly positive (p < 0.05), but the sign tests are insignificant.  In terms of the period 
of annual financial statements that are publicly available when the lockup expires, I find 
significantly positive mean (p < 0.01) and median (p < 0.05) discretionary accruals only 
for those companies that file a 10-K before the lockup expires.  Looking closer at the 
post-IPO period financial statements, the t-tests suggest that average discretionary 
accruals are significantly positive for the firms that do not trade (p <0.01) and for the 
companies that do trade (p <0.01).  Only the median for the post-IPO, non-trading sample 
firms is significantly positive (p < 0.05). 
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Tests of differences between the groups above (presented in Table 10) provide 
some evidence that mean discretionary accruals are significantly larger for the firms that 
trade as compared to those that do not trade both overall (p < 0.10) and during the post-
IPO period (p < 0.05).  The t-test results suggest that, on average, discretionary accruals 
in the first post-IPO 10-K are significantly higher overall, but that this result is driven by 
the firms with post-lockup CEO and CFO trading that file a 10-K before the lockup 
expiration.  As mentioned above, however, these tests are univariate in nature and should 
be interpreted in conjunction with the multivariate tests that follow. 
Heteroskedasticity Tests of the Discretionary Accruals Model 
 I assess the effect of using WLS on the discretionary accruals model by 
performing White’s (1980) heteroskedasticity test.  After estimating each cross-sectional 
industry model, I test for heteroskedasticity and compare the White’s test results for the 
OLS model to those for the WLS model.  To perform this analysis, I estimate 344 
different regressions over the three-year sample period (172 using OLS and 172 using 
WLS for the two-digit SIC code industries with at least 20 firms with sufficient data). 
White’s test rejects the null hypothesis of no heteroskedasticity for 90 percent of 
the OLS regressions using a cutoff of p < 0.10.  Comparing the results of White’s test 
after the OLS models to those of the WLS model indicates that the χ2 statistic decreases 
in 55 percent of the cases.  While these decreases result in the significance level dropping 
in 27 percent of the cases, 77 percent of the tests suggest that heteroskedasticity still 
exists after estimating the WLS models using a cutoff of p <0.10.  The findings suggest 
that WLS addresses the heteroskedasticity issue in some models but not in others. 
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The discretionary accrual estimates I use are basically the residuals from an 
equation used to estimate the level of normal accruals.  Ignoring scaling issues for the 
moment (which I address in Section 5 below), OLS residuals remain unbiased even in the 
presence of heteroskedasticity.  As the results above indicate, heteroskedasticity still 
remains after using WLS in the discretionary accrual estimation process, suggesting that 
the heteroskedasticity is not necessarily proportional to lagged assets.  Therefore, scaling 
by lagged assets might introduce measurement error into the estimation process.  
Wooldridge (2003) demonstrates that, as long as the measurement error in the dependent 
variable is not correlated with any of the independent variables, using OLS is not a 
problem.16 
Multivariate Tests of IPO Earnings Management Timing 
Table 11 provides the results from estimating equation (10).  The data used to 
estimate this model is a balanced, two-year panel.  As a result, I use panel methods to 
control for any time invariant, unobserved heterogeneity created by including the same 
firm in the analysis more than once.  The main concern when using either the fixed or 
random effects specification is whether the effects are correlated with the explanatory 
variables in the model.  The fixed effects estimator explicitly controls for these effects 
while the random effects estimator models these effects as part of a composite residual.  
When the random effects are correlated with an explanatory variable in the model, the 
                                                 
16 Specifically, Wooldridge (2003) explains that, if the measurement error and the independent variables are 
uncorrelated, (1) the estimated coefficients will all be unbiased when the measurement error has a zero 
mean, and (2) the estimated coefficients with the exception of the intercept will be unbiased if the 
measurement error has a non-zero mean.  As I do not interpret the intercept in the model and I do not have 
reason to believe that I am omitting a relevant variable, this measurement error does not present a problem 
in the analyses. 
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estimator is biased.  With this in mind, I choose to report the results using the random 
effects estimator for a number of reasons. 
First, the results indicate that the random effects explain a small proportion of the 
variation in PADA (0.087, untabulated), suggesting that using a random effects model in 
this case is not likely to be problematic.  Second, the results from estimating the equation 
using OLS are qualitatively similar to those from the random effects model, providing 
further evidence that the random effects explain a small portion of the variation in 
discretionary accruals and, therefore, do not have a large impact on the estimated 
coefficients.  Third, the fixed effects specification requires that all of the variables in the 
model have some within group variation across time.  An important variable in equation 
(10), PRELOCK, is fixed over time.  As a result, the fixed effects model drops this 
variable from the specification.  Attempts to run a fixed effects model in this case would 
be problematic because the base effect for an important variable that appears in an 
interaction term would be omitted. 
That said, I perform a Hausman (1978) specification test to examine whether the 
difference in coefficients between the fixed and random effects models is systematic.  
The Hausman test results in rejection of the null hypothesis that the difference in 
coefficients between the models is not systematic (p < 0.01).  Aside from the control 
variables, the only statistically significant coefficient in the fixed effects specification is 
the PRELOCK*POST estimate, which is significantly positive and of a similar magnitude 
in both models.  Therefore, for the reasons outlined above, I report the results using a 
random effects specification. 
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This model tests whether discretionary accruals differ significantly between the 
periods surrounding the IPO for the whole sample along with various subsets of the 
sample.  The overall model F statistic is significant (p < 0.01) and the model R2 is 0.106.  
Additionally, as discussed above, the random effects explain a small proportion of the 
variation of the composite residual.17 
For the companies that file a 10-K before the end of the lockup period, H1a 
predicts a significant difference between PADA in the periods surrounding the IPO.  As 
predicted, 31 ββ +  is statistically significant (p < 0.05) and it is positive.18  This provides 
evidence supporting H1a and indicates that post-IPO discretionary accruals are 
significantly larger than those in the period before the IPO for the companies that file a 
10-K before the end of the lockup period.  H1b explores whether post-IPO PADA is 
significantly different from pre-IPO PADA for IPO companies that file their first 10-K 
after the lockup expires.  I fail to reject the null hypothesis that  = 0 (p > 0.10).  Thus, 
H1b is not supported. 
1β
Overall, the univariate and multivariate results provide evidence that, on average, 
post-IPO discretionary accruals are significantly positive, and that they are significantly 
larger than those in the pre-IPO period.  Furthermore, the evidence indicates that this 
relation is confined to the group of companies that file a 10-K before the lockup 
expiration, which suggests that managers might increase discretionary accruals in the 
                                                 
17 The results of estimating equation (5) using OLS with robust standard errors clustered by firm are 
qualitatively similar to those presented in Table 11. 
18 The joint significance test of β1 + β3 = 0 using a fixed effects specification is not statistically significant.  
As discussed earlier, however, the fixed effects specification omits an important variable, PRELOCK, while 
the random effects specification does not.  Therefore, I report the results using the random effects 
estimator. 
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newly-filed financial statements in anticipation of selling shares after the lockup expires.  
Tests of H2 provide more direct tests of this issue. 
 The results for the control variables are generally as expected.  Consistent with 
Ashbaugh, LaFond, and Mayhew (2003) and Menon and Williams (2004), I find a 
significantly negative relation between PADA and (1) cash flows from operations and (2) 
firm size.  As expected, I also find that the probability of bankruptcy is negatively related 
to PADA (Menon and Williams 2004).  Similar to Klein (2002), I find a significantly 
positive relation between leverage and discretionary accruals.  I find no significant 
relation between the presence of a Big N auditor, the market to book ratio, and the 
presence of a loss and PADA.  Finally, the untabulated results for the time control 
variables suggest that discretionary accruals in 1999 (p < 0.05) and 2002 (p < 0.10) are 
significantly lower than those in 2000, the omitted category. 
Multivariate Tests of Post-Lockup Trading and Earnings Management 
 Park and Park (2004) suggest the possibility that insider trading is an endogenous 
explanatory variable when used in models with discretionary accruals as a dependent 
variable.  As a sensitivity test, they re-estimate their main model using two-stage least 
squares, and conclude that their results are not affected by controlling for this potential 
endogeneity.  To test whether the insider trading variable, SALES, is endogeneous, I run a 
variant of the Hausman (1978) test.  In order to run this test, however, I must first identify 
potential instrumental variables that are likely to be correlated with SALES, but not 
PADA.  
Aggarwal, Krigman, and Womack (2002) examine IPO-firm insider selling that 
occurs after underwriter lockups expire.  They find that post-lockup expiration insider 
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sales is a function of a number of variables: market value, venture capital backing (VC 
equals “1” if the SDC New Issues Database identifies the IPO as having venture capital 
participation, and “0” otherwise), analyst coverage indicator (COV equals “1” if the IPO 
has research coverage on First Call, and “0” otherwise), short interest at the lockup 
expiration (SI equals the short interest outstanding as reported on Bloomberg or in the 
Standard and Poor’s Daily Stock Price Record for NYSE and AMEX firms or directly 
from NASDAQ for the NASDAQ firms), and analyst recommendations (divided between 
lead and non-lead analysts).  Following Aggarwal, Krigman, and Womack (2002), I 
measure analyst recommendations using two variables, NLEAD, which equals the number 
of non-lead analyst recommendations on First Call, and LEAD, which equals the number 
of lead-underwriter analyst recommendations on First Call. 
In addition to the variables listed above, I include three other instrumental 
variables.  The first variable measures the proportion of secondary shares (i.e., shares 
included in the offering being sold by pre-IPO owners) sold in the IPO (SECONDARY), 
which I obtain from the SDC New Issues Database.  The second variable measures 
insider ownership (INSOWN) after the offering, which I obtain from the SDC New Issues 
Database (when available) or hand collect from the offering prospectus.  The final 
variable measures whether or not the CEO or CFO sells shares prior to the lockup 
expiration (PRETRADE), which I create from the data included in Table 1 of the 
Thomson Financial Insiders database.  These measures of insider ownership and insider 
sales are expected to be related to post-lockup expiration CEO and CFO share sales. 
The first step of this test is to regress the potentially endogeneous variable, 
SALES, on the exogeneous variables in equation (11) along with the instrumental 
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variables listed above.  Next, I save the residuals from this equation and include them as 
an independent variable in equation (11) along with SALES and the control variables.  For 
this test, I exclude the interaction term (PRELOCK*SALES) because I am testing whether 
one piece of the interaction term, SALES, is endogeneous.  The final test of endogeneity 
is the t-test of the whether the coefficient on the residual (RESID) is statistically 
significant. 
Table 12 includes the results from both of these regressions.  Model 1 includes the 
model regressing SALES on the exogenous variables from equation (11) along with the 
instrumental variables.  The overall model is significant (p < 0.01) and the adjusted R2 is 
0.07.  More importantly, the joint F-test that SI = VC = COV = NLEAD = LEAD = 
PRETRADE = SECONDARY = INSOWN = 0 is highly significant (p < 0.01), suggesting 
that at least one of the instrumental variables is a good predictor of SALES.  Model 2 then 
estimates equation (11) with RESID and without the interaction term.  The t-test for the 
coefficient on RESID is insignificant (p = 0.62).  This suggests that SALES is not 
endogeneous in equation (11). 
Table 13 provides the results from estimating equation (11) using OLS.19  This 
model tests H2, which predicts a positive relation between post-lockup CEO and CFO 
trading and discretionary accruals in the financial statements available to the public when 
the lockup expires.  The overall model F statistic is significant (p < 0.01) and the model 
adjusted R2 is 0.20.  The coefficient on PRELOCK*SALES is significantly positive (p < 
0.10).  This result indicates that the effect of SALES on PADA depends on which 
                                                 
19 The p-values reported throughout the paper for the OLS estimations are calculated using White (1980) 
standard errors.  The inferences are unchanged running OLS with non-robust standard errors.  
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financial statements are publicly available at the time the lockup expires.  The joint test 
that SALES + SALES*POST = 0 is significantly positive (p < 0.10), which suggests that, 
for companies that file a new 10-K before the expiration of the lockup agreement, the 
relation between the percentage of CEO and CFO shares traded and discretionary 
accruals is significantly positive. 
 Similar to the results for equation (10) I find a significantly negative relation 
between cash flows from operations, firm size, and the probability of bankruptcy and 
discretionary accruals, and a positive relation between and LEV and PADA.  In contrast to 
the equation (10) results and consistent with Ashbaugh, LaFond, and Mayhew (2003), 
MKTBK is significantly positively related to PADA in equation (11).  The untabulated 
results for the time control variables suggest that discretionary accruals in 1999 (p < 0.05) 
are significantly lower than those in 2000, the omitted category. 
 
5. SENSITIVITY TESTS 
Analysts’ Earnings Estimates 
 One of the arguments for the reasonableness of using IPO-year discretionary 
accruals in the IPO setting is that management will be under pressure from its lead 
underwriter(s) to meet their analysts’ established earnings targets (Teoh, Welch, and 
Wong 1998; Teoh, Wong, and Rao 1998).  This argument provides an alternative 
explanation for the observed findings for H1.  As a result, this section addresses the 
concern that the pressure to meet analysts’ forecasts is a correlated omitted variable in the 
original analyses. 
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To address this issue, I create a variable that captures whether or not the company 
meets or exceeds the mean First Call consensus earnings target in the IPO year.  I begin 
by estimating non-discretionary earnings by subtracting my estimate of discretionary 
accruals from the income number used to estimate discretionary accruals (DATA123).  
Next, I divide non-discretionary earnings by total common shares outstanding 
(DATA25).  This number represents my estimate of actual non-discretionary EPS.  Next, 
I compare the last reported mean First Call consensus EPS forecast (obtained from the 
First Call Historical Database) for the IPO year end to the non-discretionary EPS number 
I calculate.  I then create a variable, ATABOVE, that equals “1” if non-discretionary EPS 
is greater than or equal to the mean First Call consensus EPS forecast, and “0” otherwise.  
Finally, I add the ATABOVE variable to equation (10) and estimate the model running 
OLS on sample data from the IPO year. 
Table 14 presents the results of estimating equation (10) using OLS on the IPO-
year data both excluding and including the ATABOVE variable.  The sample used for the 
first two models includes all of the sample companies while the third and fourth models 
include only the firms with an available First Call consensus EPS estimate for the IPO 
year.  The results for Model 1 and Model 3 are consistent with the conclusions for H1; 
that is, IPO-year discretionary accruals are significantly larger for companies that file a 
new 10-K before the lockup expires than those firms that file a new 10-K after the lockup 
expires for the whole sample (p < 0.05) and for the subset of companies that have a First 
Call EPS estimate available (p < 0.05).  ATABOVE is negative and highly significant in 
Model 2 (p < 0.01) and Model 4 (p < 0.01) suggesting that companies with estimated 
non-discretionary earnings at or above analysts’ consensus forecasts have significantly 
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lower discretionary accruals.  More importantly, however, is that the results for the 
coefficients on the PRELOCK variable remain significantly positive after controlling for 
whether or not non-discretionary earnings are at or above the consensus forecast, 
suggesting that the main results are not sensitive to whether or not companies have 
pressure to manage earnings to meet or beat analysts’ forecasts. 
Fiscal Year Timing 
PRELOCK is a measure of whether or not the company provides new annual 
financial data to the market before the lockup agreement expires.  In the main analyses, 
this measure equals “1” if the company files its first 10-K before its lockup agreement 
expires, and “0” otherwise, regardless of whether or not the company files additional 10-
Qs between the 10-K filing date and the lockup expiration date.  Given the possibility that 
a company could file a new 10-Q before the lockup expires, the annual data for some of 
the PRELOCK = 1 companies is not the most recent financial data that is publicly 
available at the time the lockup expires.  For these companies, CEOs and CFOs who plan 
to sell shares after the lockup expiration would have the opportunity to manage the 
earnings they disclose in the last 10-Q that is publicly released before the lockup expires.  
As a result, I would expect the results that I document for H1 to be strongest for the 
subset of firms whose 10-K is the last publicly filed financial statements at the time the 
lockup expires.  To test this assertion, I define a new variable, QPRELOCK, which equals 
“1” if the company files its first 10-K before its lockup agreement expires and the 
company is not required to file a new 10-Q until after the lockup expiration, and “0” 
otherwise.  To decide whether each PRELOCK = 1 firm is also a QPRELOCK = 1 firm, I 
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determine whether the company would have been required to file a new 10-Q between 
the 10-K due date and the lockup expiration date.20 
Table 15 includes two random effects models that test whether the H1 results are 
strongest for the companies that file a new 10-K before their lockup expires but do not 
file a new 10-Q until after the lockup expires.  In Model 1, I replace the PRELOCK 
variable with QPRELOCK, and in Model 2 I estimate equation (10) excluding the 
companies for which QPRELOCK = 1.  Consistent with the results for PRELOCK*POST 
from equation (10), Model 1 documents a significantly positive coefficient on 
QPRELOCK*POST (p < 0.10).  Furthermore, the joint significance test for H1a is 
significant at the same levels as in equation (10) (p < 0.05).  The results from Model 2 
suggest that, after excluding the QPRELOCK = 1 companies, I no longer detect a 
significant relation between POST + PRELOCK*POST, and PADA.  Taken together, 
these results suggest that the firms that file a 10-K before the lockup expires have 
significantly higher discretionary accruals, and that this relation is driven by the 
companies that do not file new financial statements between the 10-K filing and the date 
the lockup expires. 
Type of Shares Issued (Primary versus Combined Offerings) 
 An interesting question regarding the timing of the incentive to manage earnings 
in the periods surrounding IPOs is who is selling the shares.  When a company goes 
public by issuing new securities (i.e., primary shares), the company receives the proceeds 
from the offering and, in turn, can use these funds to finance its operating and investing 
                                                 
20 During the sample period, 10-K filings were due within 90 days of the end of a fiscal year, and 10-Q 
filings were due within 45 days of the end of each of the first three fiscal quarters.  Using these 
requirements, I assign a value of “1” to QPRELOCK if the company files its first 10-K before its lockup 
period expires, and the lockup period expires within 135 days (90 days + 45 days) of its fiscal year end. 
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activities.  On the other hand, the offering might include shares being sold by pre-IPO 
owners (typically insiders), and the proceeds from those shares (i.e., secondary shares) go 
to the previous owners.  Given that the proceeds from primary shares flow to the 
company while the proceeds from secondary shares flow to the prior owners, whether or 
not the offering includes secondary shares could have an impact on the timing of earnings 
management surrounding the IPO. 
The main results reported in Section 4 of this study suggest that CEO and CFO 
trading is positively associated with discretionary accruals in the post-IPO period when 
the company releases new annual financial statements after the offering but before insider 
trading can begin.  To further test whether insider selling affects the timing of earnings 
management behavior, I examine the effect of an offering including secondary shares on 
the results for H1.  I expect to observe that the significantly higher IPO-year discretionary 
accruals are concentrated in the PRELOCK firms when no secondary shares are sold in 
the offering.  In addition, if insider sales really do drive the incentive to manage earnings, 
I would expect to find weaker IPO-year results for offerings that include secondary 
shares along with higher pre-IPO discretionary accruals. 
I examine the effect of the mix of shares issued between primary and secondary 
shares by estimating equation (10) separately for the offerings that include (1) solely 
primary shares and (2) a combination of primary and secondary shares.  In untabulated 
results I find that 265 of the 298 sample firms issue only primary shares in the IPO, and 
that the level of discretionary accruals included in first 10-K is significantly higher than 
the level of discretionary accruals included in the pre-IPO financial statements, but only 
for companies that file a new 10-K before the lockup expiration (p < 0.05).  For the 
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remaining 33 IPO firms that issue a combination of primary and secondary shares, on the 
other hand, the results suggest that IPO-year discretionary accruals are significantly lower 
than those in the pre-IPO period (p < 0.10), and that this result holds for both PRELOCK 
= 0 and PRELOCK = 1 firms (i.e., the coefficient on PRELOCK*POST is not 
significant).  These findings provide further evidence that the timing of IPO-firm 
earnings management is related to the timing of when insiders can sell their shares. 
Proportion of Equity Issued and Retained 
Two questions related to the type of shares issued (i.e., primary versus secondary 
shares) are whether the amount of shares issued in the IPO and/or retained by insiders 
after the offering affect the observed relations.  It is conceivable that the companies that 
issue a smaller proportion of shares in their IPO might do so in anticipation of selling 
additional shares later in an SEO.  As a result, these firms might not have as big of an 
incentive to manage earnings around the time of their IPO if they plan to issue shares 
sometime in the future.  While I am unable to measure the intent of management at the 
time of the IPO, I can observe whether their firm does or does not subsequently perform 
an SEO.  Therefore, I attempt to control for this possibility by using the SDC New Issues 
Database to identify the firms that issue equity in subsequent SEOs.  Interestingly, when I 
estimate equation (10) separately for companies that undertake an SEO within one year 
of the IPO, the overall model for the firms with subsequent SEOs becomes insignificant.  
In the model for firms that do not undertake a subsequent SEO, the test of POST + 
POST*PRELOCK = 0 remains significant (p < 0.05).  I use a similar split on the sample 
that I use to estimate equation (11), and I find that the test of SALES + 
SALES*PRELOCK = 0 for the firms that do not undertake a subsequent SEO becomes 
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more significant (p < 0.01).  I fail to find a significant relation between SALES and PADA 
for the companies that do undertake a subsequent SEO.21  These results suggest that, for 
the firms that file a new 10-K before the lockup expires, discretionary accruals are 
significantly larger in the IPO year than those in the pre-IPO year but that this result only 
holds for the firms that do not hold an SEO within one year of the offering.  Furthermore, 
these findings suggest that the positive relation between SALES and PADA for the 
PRELOCK = 1 firms is confined to the companies that do not issue equity in a 
subsequent SEO. 
One might argue that pre-lockup-period discretionary accruals are associated with 
the level of ownership retained by insiders.  Leland and Pyle (1977) analytically 
demonstrate that retained ownership is a signal of firm quality that helps to reduce 
information asymmetry, and empirical evidence suggests that retained ownership is 
positively associated with IPO initial market value (Clarkson et al. 1991; Downes and 
Heinkel 1982).  This suggests that retained ownership is a positive signal to the market of 
the future prospects of the firm because the original owners decide to hold onto their 
shares in the firm.  While managers who hold onto a larger proportion of the firm might 
have more motivation to manage earnings in order to increase the IPO proceeds, the 
signaling argument suggests that managers of these firms might not need to manage 
earnings because these are higher quality companies.  As a result, I measure retained 
insider ownership using the percentage of shares that directors and executive officers 
hold as disclosed in the prospectus.  I then add this variable as an additional control 
                                                 
21 The results of these analyses are not sensitive to splitting the sample based on whether or not the 
company undertakes an SEO within one, two, three, or four years of the offering. 
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variable in equations (10) and (11).  The insider ownership variable is not statistically 
significant in either model, and the inferences from the models that include insider 
ownership are qualitatively similar to those drawn from equations (10) and (11) 
suggesting that, in the IPO setting, insider ownership does not have a statistically 
significant effect on discretionary accruals. 
Underwriter Reputation 
Prestigious underwriters tend to take lower risk firms public (Carter and Manaster 
1990).  One dimension of this risk is the aggressiveness of the IPO-firms’ financial 
reporting behavior.  Therefore, companies with more reputable underwriters might tend 
to engage in less earnings management around the time of the offering because they are 
higher quality companies.  To control for underwriter reputation, I use the Loughran and 
Ritter (2004) underwriter rankings list that has been updated through 2004 and is 
available on Jay Ritter’s website (Ritter).22  These rankings build on those of Carter, 
Dark, and Singh (1998) and Carter and Manaster (1990).  Using this list and the lead 
underwriter(s) for each sample company obtained from the SDC New Issues Database, I 
create an indicator variable that captures whether or not the lead underwriter (or one of 
the lead underwriters in the case of multiple leads) is identified on the prestigious 
underwriters list.  Splitting the sample based on this variable, I re-estimate equations (10) 
and (11) separately for the firms with a reputable underwriter and for those without to see 
whether the inferences are sensitive to this classification.  The results suggest that my 
findings for H1 and H2 are confined to the companies with underwriters that are not 
                                                 
22 This list includes the following underwriters: ABN Amro, Banc of America Securities, Bear Stearns, 
Citigroup, CIBC, Credit Suisse First Boston, Deutsche Bank, Goldman Sachs, HSBC Securities, JP 
Morgan, Lazard, Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch, Morgan Stanley, Salomon Smith Barney, Sandler 
O’Neill Partners, Thomas Weisel Partners LLC, and UBS. 
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listed on the prestigious underwriters list, suggesting that firms that have a prestigious 
lead underwriter are less likely to manage earnings.  Three potential explanations for this 
finding are that (1) reputable underwriters tend to take companies public that have a 
lower propensity to manage earnings, (2) reputable underwriters are able to constrain 
earnings management behavior, or (3) having a reputable underwriter provides a signal to 
the market of firm quality that alleviates the need to manage earnings.  Future research 
might address this issue further. 
Discretionary Accruals Model Specification 
 In this section, I re-estimate equation (10) and equation (11) using a different 
measure of the dependent variable, PADA.  Instead of using discretionary accrual 
estimates from the WLS regressions that scale the variables by lagged assets (WLS 
estimates), I use the estimates from OLS regressions that include lagged assets as an 
independent variable (OLS estimates).  The remainder of the estimation process (i.e., in 
terms of the variable definitions, performance adjustment, independent variables, and 
models used) is identical to that described in the Research Design and Results sections 
above. 
First, I compare the H1 results from equation (10) estimated using the WLS 
estimates (see Table 11) to those from equation (10) estimated using the OLS estimates 
(untabulated).  Using the OLS estimates, the equation (10) overall F statistic is significant 
(p < 0.05) but at a lower level than that for the equation using the WLS estimates (p < 
0.01).  The model R2 is 0.044 using the OLS estimates, which is lower than that reported 
in Table11 (0.106).  Similar to those from the model using the WLS estimates, the 
random effects in the model with OLS estimates explain a small proportion of the 
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variation of the composite residual (0.14).  The results for the test variables, however, 
differ based on whether I use WLS or OLS estimates.  Using the OLS estimates, I fail to 
reject the null hypothesis that the coefficients on POST and POST*PRELOCK are 
significantly different from zero at conventional levels.  Furthermore, I find no evidence 
to suggest that the sum of these coefficients is significantly different from zero using the 
OLS model estimates.  Thus, using the OLS model estimates, I fail to find any 
statistically significant differences in discretionary accruals between the pre- and post-
IPO periods. 
For the control variables, the coefficient signs and significance for cash flows 
from operations, leverage, and financial condition are consistent between the models.  
The coefficient on SIZE is significantly negative when using the WLS estimates while it 
is insignificant when using the OLS estimates, and LOSS is significantly negative when 
using the OLS estimates while it is insignificant when using the WLS estimates.  Finally, 
none of the time controls are statistically significant in the model using the OLS estimates 
whereas the coefficients for 1999 and 2002 are significantly negative in the model using 
the WLS estimates. 
 Next, I compare the H2 results from estimating equation (11) using the WLS 
estimates (see Table 13) to those from equation (11) estimated using the OLS estimates 
(untabulated).  While the WLS model provides evidence in favor of H2, the overall F 
statistic in the model using the OLS estimates is not significant. 
The conclusions drawn from testing H1 and H2 using discretionary accruals 
estimated from the WLS model are different from those using discretionary accruals 
estimated using the OLS model.  Prior literature has concluded that the scaled version of 
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this model is able to detect earnings manipulation (see e.g. Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeny 
1995), while prior research has not assessed the power of the unscaled OLS specification 
in detecting this behavior.  Future research might assess the ability of the unscaled OLS 
model that includes a scale proxy in detecting earnings management. 
 
6. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
Previous research in the IPO setting documents high levels of discretionary 
accruals in the periods surrounding an IPO (DuCharme, Malatesta, and Sefcik 2001; 
DuCharme, Malatesta, and Sefcik 2004; Friedlan 1994; Teoh, Welch, and Wong 1998; 
Teoh, Wong, and Rao 1998).  My paper contributes to this literature by furthering our 
understanding of what drives the incentive for earnings management for companies going 
public.  Specifically, I test whether, on average, IPO-firm management records larger 
discretionary accruals in the period before the IPO (presumably to boost offering 
proceeds) or whether they record larger discretionary accruals in the period before 
management can begin trading shares (presumably to help support the stock price when 
the lockup expires).  The results indicate that the companies that file a 10-K before the 
lockup period expires exhibit more earnings management behavior in those 10-K 
financial statements as compared to the prospectus financial statements.  This suggests 
that managers might increase discretionary accruals in the newly-filed financial 
statements in anticipation of selling shares after the lockup expires. 
To test this conclusion, I examine the relation between post-lockup IPO-firm 
insider trades and discretionary accruals in the annual financial statements from the 
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period before the trading is allowed to occur.  The trading analyses support this assertion; 
that is, I observe a significantly positive relation between the proportion of CEO and 
CFO shares traded following the lockup period expiration and discretionary accruals, and 
this relation is limited to the firms that file a new 10-K before the lockup period expires.  
Taken together, the results suggest that earnings management behavior is more prevalent 
in the first 10-K filed than in the offering prospectus, that it is concentrated in the firms 
that file this 10-K before their lockup period expires, and that it is related to insider 
trading. 
A limitation of this study is its use of discretionary accruals as a proxy for 
earnings management.  Because I cannot observe IPO-firm earnings management 
behavior directly, I estimate accounting discretion using a modified version of the Jones 
(1991) model, which might measure discretionary accruals with error.  Additionally, the 
model does not discriminate between earnings management that is within GAAP and 
earnings management that violates GAAP.  I do, however, control for misspecification in 
the model associated with extreme performance using a portfolio matching technique 
commonly used in prior literature. 
The sensitivity tests raise another question about the discretionary accruals model 
used.  I find that the results using a discretionary accrual estimate from a scaled model 
differ from those from an unscaled model.  Previous research, however, uses a scaled 
model, and the literature documents that discretionary accruals estimated using a scaled 
model are associated with opportunistic IPO-firm behavior (DuCharme, Malatesta, and 
Sefcik 2004; Teoh, Wong, and Rao 1998).  Future research might further examine the 
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ability of the unscaled OLS model that includes a scale proxy to detect earnings 
management. 
Subject to the limitations discussed above, the results of this study will help to 
further develop our understanding of the incentives to manage earnings around the time 
of an IPO.  The evidence provided might be of interest to regulators and IPO investors as 
it can help them to identify the specific period around the offering in which the financial 
statements are most likely to have been affected by managements’ attempts to increase 
earnings. 
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TABLE 1: SAMPLE SELECTION – PART 1 
Description
Number of 
Firms
IPOs on SDCa 459            
Insufficient Compustat data (95)             
Sales = 0 (21)             
Missing control variables (20)             
EDGAR filing missing (9)               
Discretionary accrual outliers (8)               
Fewer than 20 companies in two-digit SIC (4)               
Not on Compustat (4)               
Total 298            
a Four hundred sixty-six IPOs met the sample criteria using SDC.  
Of these 466 firms, however, the prospectuses for two firms 
revealed that the firms are foreign, and the prospectus for one 
firm identified it as a closed-end fund.  Examination of the 
Compustat data for four other firms indicated that the firms were 
either in the insurance industry (3 firms) or banking industry (1 
firm).  
 
 
 
 
TABLE 2: IPO DISTRIBUTION BY YEAR 
Year
Offering 
Date
Prospectus 
Financial 
Statement 
Date
1999 -                 193             
2000 216             64               
2001 49               39               
2002 33               2                 
Total 298             298              
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TABLE 3: LOCKUP AGREEMENT LENGTH 
Lockup 
Length
No Pre-
Lockup 
Expiration 
10-K
Pre-Lockup 
Expiration 
10-K Total
90 days 6                 1                 7                 
180 days 233             53               286             
360 days -                 1                 1                 
365 days -                 1                 1                 
540 days -                 2                 2                 
720 days -                 1                 1                 
239             59               298              
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TABLE 4: VARIABLE DEFINITIONS – PART 1 
Variable 
Name Variable Definition
AUDITOR = 1 if Compustat (DATA149) indicates the presence of a Big N 
auditor for the firm-year, and 0 otherwise.
CFO = cash flows from operations (DATA308) at the end of the period 
scaled by total assets (DATA6) at the end of the period.
MKTVAL = equity market value, where pre-IPO market value is measured by 
the market value of equity at the end of the first trading day, and 
equity market value in the IPO year is the share price multiplied 
by the number of shares outstanding (DATA199*DATA25) at 
the end of the IPO year.
MKTBK = equity market value divided by the book value of assets 
(DATA6).
LEV = total debt (DATA9+DATA34) divided by total assets (DATA6), 
all at the end of the period.
FCOND = Zmijewski’s (1984) financial condition index, which controls for 
financial distress.
LOSS = 1 if the company had a net loss (DATA172) during the period, 
and 0 otherwise.
PRELOCK = 1 if the company filed its first 10-K before its lockup agreement 
expired, and 0 otherwise.
SALES = CEO/CFO trading during the three-month period beginning when 
the lockup expires as a percentage of total shares outstanding.
POST = 1 if the firm-year observation represents data from the IPO year, 
and 0 if the observation comes from the last annual period prior 
to the offering.
SIZE = the natural log of MKTVAL.
PADA = performance-adjusted discretionary accruals estimated using a 
cross-sectional version of the modified-Jones model.
VC = 1 if the SDC New Issues Database identifies the IPO as having 
venture capital participation, and 0 otherwise.
COV = 1 if the IPO has research coverage on the First Call Historical 
Database, and 0 otherwise.
SI = the short interest outstanding for the month of the lockup 
expiration as reported on Bloomberg or in the Standard and 
Poor’s Daily Stock Price Record for NYSE and AMEX firms or 
as received directly from NASDAQ for the NASDAQ firms.  
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TABLE 4: CONTINUED 
Variable 
Name Variable Definition
NLEAD = the number of non-lead analyst recommendations on the First 
Call Historical Database during the period between the IPO and 
one month following the lockup expiration.
LEAD = the number of lead analyst recommendations on the First Call 
Historical Database during the period between the IPO and one 
month following the lockup expiration.
PRETRADE = 1 if the CEO or CFO sells shares prior to the lockup expiration 
according to Table 1 of the Thomson Financial Insiders database, 
0 otherwise.
SECONDARY = the proportion of shares that existing shareholders sell in the IPO 
(i.e., secondary shares) obtained from the SDC New Issues 
Database.
INSOWN = insider ownership obtained from either the SDC New Issues 
Database (when available) or from the offering prospectus.
RESID = predicted residuals from the first-stage equation used to perform 
a Hausman test for endogeneity.
ATABOVE = 1 if non-discretionary EPS is at or above the mean First Call 
analyst consensus EPS forecast (obtained from the First Call 
Historical Database) for the IPO year, 0 otherwise.
QPRELOCK = 1 if the company files its first 10-K before its lockup agreement 
expires and the company is not required to file a new 10-Q until 
after the lockup expiration, and 0 otherwise.  
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TABLE 5: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR CONTROL VARIABLES – PART 1 
Variable 
Name Pre-IPO IPO Year Total
AUDITOR 0.97       0.96        0.97        
(1) (1) (1)
[0.16] [0.20] [0.18]
CFO -0.21 -0.08 -0.15
(-0.11) (-0.05) (-0.07)
[0.49] [0.22] [0.39]
MKTVAL 963.5     888.6      926.1      
(453.9) (326.5) (396.1)
[1,721.9] [3,583.1] [2,808.9]
MKTBK 25.13     2.83        13.98      
(12.00) (2.14) (3.57)
[36.92] [2.54] [28.42]
LEV 0.31       0.10        0.21        
(0.16) (0.02) (0.05)
[0.42] [0.22] [0.35]
FCOND -2.02 -4.34 -3.18
(-2.59) (-4.58) (-3.76)
[3.74] [1.83] [3.16]
LOSS 0.73       0.69        0.71        
(1) (1) (1)
[0.44] [0.46] [0.45]
See Table 4 for variable definitions.  The numbers above represent means, (medians), 
and [standard deviations].
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TABLE 6: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR DISCRETIONARY ACCRUALS (H1) 
Pre-IPO IPO Year Overall
0.01         1.33         0.67          
(-0.02) (0.03) (0.01)
[239] [239] [478]
0.40         2.73         1.57          
(0.04) (0.24) (0.13)
[59] [59] [118]
0.08         1.61         
(0.00) (0.04)
[298] [298]
See Table 4 for variable definitions.  Tests of significance for the means 
(medians) are based on t-tests (sign tests).  Bold numbers denote significance at 
the 5% level or better, one-tailed. The numbers in brackets represent the number 
of observations.
Pre-Lockup Expiration 10-K
(PRELOCK = 1)
Overall
No Pre-Lockup Expiration 10-K
(PRELOCK = 0)
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 7: UNIVARIATE TESTS OF DIFFERENCES FOR DISCRETIONARY ACCRUALS (H1) 
Diff. p-value Diff. p-value
IPO Year vs. pre-IPO 1.53    0.000 0.04    0.042
IPO Year vs. pre-IPO (PRELOCK = 1) 2.33    0.000 0.20    0.018
IPO Year vs. pre-IPO (PRELOCK = 0) 1.33    0.000 0.04    0.301
See Table 4 for variable definitions.  Tests for differences in means are based on 
paired t-tests.  Tests for differences in medians are based on sign tests.  Bold numbers 
denote significance at the 5% level or better, two-tailed.
Sign testPaired t-test
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TABLE 8: CEO AND CFO TRADING 
n Mean Min Median Max
SALES for all firms 298 0.134% 0.000% 0.000% 5.119%
SALES for firms with CEO/CFO trading 72 0.555% 0.005% 0.267% 5.119%
See Table 4 for variable definitions.  
 
 
 
 
TABLE 9: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR DISCRETIONARY ACCRUALS (H2) 
Pre-IPO IPO Year Overall
0.04       1.83         0.35       
(-0.00) (0.23) (0.02)
[186] [40] [226]
(0.10)     4.64         1.15       
(-0.08) (0.24) (-0.03)
[53] [19] [72]
0.01       2.73         
(-0.02) (0.24)
[239] [59]
See Table 4 for variable definitions.  Tests of significance for the means (medians) 
are based on t-tests (sign tests).  Bold numbers denote significance at the 5% level 
or better, one-tailed. The numbers in brackets represent the number of 
observations.
Post-lockup CEO and CFO Trading 
(SALES > 0)
No post-lockup CEO and CFO Trading
(SALES = 0)
Overall
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TABLE 10: UNIVARIATE TESTS OF DIFFERENCES FOR DISCRETIONARY ACCRUALS (H2) 
Diff. p-value Diff. p-value
Trading vs. No Trading 0.80      0.053 -0.06 0.744
Trading vs. No Trading (Prospectus Financials) -0.14 0.658 -0.08 0.250
Trading vs. No Trading (10-K Financials) 2.81      0.048 0.02      0.228
See Table 4 for variable definitions.  Tests for differences in means are based on two-sample t-
tests.  Non-parametric tests for differences are based on Wilcoxon tests.  Bold numbers denote 
significance at the 10% level or better, two-tailed.
Wilcoxon testt-test
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TABLE 11: MULTIVARIATE TIMING MODEL 
Estimate Std. Error Z-stat p-value
INTERCEPT 1.54         1.38         1.12        0.265
POST 0.38         0.49         0.77        0.439
PRELOCK 0.23         0.57         0.41        0.681
PRELOCK*POST 1.32         0.77         1.73        0.084
AUDITOR 0.83         0.92         0.90        0.369
CFO -1.93 0.76         -2.55 0.011
SIZE -0.58 0.15         -3.88 0.000
MKTBK 0.00         0.01         0.37        0.712
LEV 2.21         0.89         2.48        0.013
FCOND -0.39 0.13         -3.10 0.002
LOSS 0.10         0.41         0.25        0.805
Hypothesis Tests
H1a: POST + PRELOCK*POST = 0 1.71         0.029
H1b: POST = 0 0.38         0.439
n
Prob > χ2
R2
0.000
0.106
See Table 4 for variable definitions.  The dependent variable in this model is PADA.  This model 
is estimated using the random effects specification.  The data set includes financial data from 
both the pre-IPO and IPO year for each sample firm.  The time control dummy variables are not 
reported for expositional convenience.  In comparison to 2000, the omitted year, the time 
coefficients for 1999 (p < 0.05) and 2002 (p < 0.10) are significantly negative.  Bold numbers 
denote significance at the 10% level or better, two-tailed.
596
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TABLE 12: TRADING MODEL TESTS FOR ENDOGENEITY 
Estimate p-value Estimate p-value
INTERCEPT 0.12      0.628 0.02      0.990
SALES 1.61      0.280
RESID -0.76 0.624
PRELOCK 0.08      0.329 1.53      0.012
AUDITOR -0.19 0.196 -0.07 0.950
CFO -0.11 0.332 -2.86 0.001
SIZE -0.00 0.919 -0.43 0.033
MKTBK 0.00      0.136 0.01      0.413
LEV 0.13      0.369 3.88      0.000
FCOND -0.03 0.098 -0.64 0.000
LOSS -0.01 0.853 0.11      0.828
SI 0.00      0.246
VC -0.05 0.402
COV -0.04 0.612
NLEAD 0.00      0.608
LEAD -0.00 0.946
PRETRADE 0.39      0.000
SECONDARY -0.00 0.303
INSOWN 0.00      0.145
n
Prob > F
Adjusted R2
294
Model 2
294
Model 1
0.003
0.072
See Table 4 for variable definitions.  The dependent variable in Model 1 is SALES and 
the dependent variable in Model 2 is PADA.  These models are estimated using OLS.  
The data for each company comes from the last annual financial statements filed before 
the lockup period expires.  The time control dummy variables are not reported for 
expositional convenience.  In comparison to 2000, the omitted year, the time coefficient 
for 1999 is significantly negative (p < 0.05) in Model 2.  Bold numbers denote 
significance at the 10% level or better, two-tailed.
0.000
0.163
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Estimate p-value
INTERCEPT 0.04       0.983
SALES -0.00 0.993
PRELOCK 1.04       0.131
PRELOCK*SALES 3.14       0.057
AUDITOR 0.28       0.746
CFO -2.84 0.000
SIZE -0.49 0.008
MKTBK 0.01       0.000
LEV 4.16       0.000
FCOND -0.67 0.022
LOSS 0.10       0.841
Hypothesis Tests
SALES + PRELOCK*SALES = 0 3.14       0.054
SALES -0.00 0.993
n
Prob > F
Adjusted R2
See Table 4 for variable definitions.  The dependent variable is 
PADA.  This model is estimated using OLS with White (1980) 
standard errors.  The data for each company comes from the last 
annual financial statements filed before the lockup period 
expires.  The time control dummy variables are not reported for 
expositional convenience.  In comparison to 2000, the omitted 
year, the time coefficient for 1999 is significantly negative (p < 
0.01).  Bold numbers denote significance at the 10% level or 
better, two-tailed.
298
0.000
0.203
 
TABLE 13: MULTIVARIATE TRADING MODELS 
Estimate p-value Estimate p-value Estimate p-value Estimate p-value
INTERCEPT 2.45      0.404    3.19      0.276    3.13      0.541    5.49      0.260    
PRELOCK 1.75      0.037    1.38      0.096    7.97      0.017    7.15      0.020    
ATABOVE -3.47 0.000    -4.89 0.000    
AUDITOR 1.31      0.330    1.68      0.213    0.32      0.836    1.73      0.276    
CFO -4.27 0.089    -3.21 0.177    -4.38 0.400    -1.03 0.822    
MKTBK 0.08      0.634    0.13      0.433    -0.09 0.727    0.05      0.835    
LEV 1.63      0.355    1.67      0.362    -2.34 0.596    -2.05 0.650    
FCOND -0.12 0.696    -0.06 0.847    -0.07 0.905    0.18      0.731    
SIZE -0.55 0.078    -0.57 0.063    -0.55 0.284    -0.62 0.234    
LOSS -0.21 0.742    -0.29 0.643    0.76      0.586    0.53      0.673    
Prob > F
Adjusted R2 0.322
Sample Firms with First Call EPS 
Estimates (n = 95)
Model 3 Model 4
0.073 0.002
See Table 4 for variable definitions.  The dependent variable in each of these models is PADA.  These 
models are estimated using OLS with White (1980) standard errors.  The data for each company comes 
from the period covered by the first 10-K filed after the IPO.  The time control dummy variables are not 
reported for expositional convenience.  In comparison to 2000, the omitted year, the time coefficients for 
2001 and 2002 are both significantly negative in Model 1 (p < 0.05 and p < 0.10, respectively).  The time 
coefficients for 2001, 2002, and 2003 are significantly negative in Model 2 (p < 0.01, p < 0.01, and p < 
0.05, respectively).  Bold numbers denote significance at the 10% level or better, two-tailed.
0.136
All Sample Firms (n = 298)
Model 1 Model 2
0.006
0.093
0.000
0.109
TABLE 14: ANALYSTS’ EARNINGS FORECASTS 
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TABLE 15: TIMING OF THE 10-K FILING 
Estimate p-value Estimate p-value
INTERCEPT 1.88       0.170   2.51       0.072   
POST 0.43       0.375   0.38       0.438   
QPRELOCK 0.37       0.565   
QPRELOCK*POST 1.65       0.059   
PRELOCK 0.51       0.689   
PRELOCK*POST -0.23 0.809   
AUDITOR 0.61       0.503   0.53       0.559   
CFO -1.88 0.013   -1.72 0.024   
SIZE -0.59 0.000   -0.67 0.000   
MKTBK 0.00       0.701   0.00       0.550   
LEV 2.14       0.016   2.27       0.013   
FCOND -0.38 0.003   -0.36 0.004   
LOSS 0.07       0.869   0.08       0.850   
n
Prob > χ2
R2
Hypothesis Tests
H1a: POST + QPRELOCK*POST = 0 2.08       0.020   0.15       0.489   
H1b: POST = 0 0.43       0.375   0.38       0.765   
0.000
0.110
See Table 4 for variable definitions.   The dependent variable in each of these 
models is PADA.  These models are estimated using random effects models.  The 
data set includes financial data from both the pre-IPO and IPO year for each sample 
firm.  The time control dummy variables are not reported for expositional 
convenience. In comparison to 2000, the omitted year, the time coefficients for 
1999 (p < 0.05 and p < 0.05) and 2002 (p < 0.05 and p < 0.10) are significantly 
negative in Model 1 and Model 2, respectively.  Bold numbers denote significance 
at the 10% level or better, two-tailed.
0.105
512
0.000
Model 1 Model 2
596
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FIGURE 1: HOTELS.COM IPO AND FINANCIAL REPORTING TIMELINE 
Timeline of events surrounding the Hotels.com IPO.  This timeline provides an 
example of a firm that files its first 10-K after the lockup period expires.  Had 
Hotels.com filed its first 10-K between February 25, 2000 and August 23, 2000, the 
company would provide an example of how a company could file its first 10-K before 
the lockup period expires. 
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FIGURE 2: CEO AND CFO POST-IPO TRADING ACTIVITY 
Graph of CEO and CFO sales during each month following the IPO.  The sample 
consists of 298 firms that went public between January 2000 and July 30, 2002.  The 
graph contains the mean and trimmed mean (trimmed at the 99th and 1st percentiles) 
number of shares sold by the CEO and CFO captured in the Thomson Financial 
Insiders database.  The data spans from the second through the 18th month public. 
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PART 2: CHANGES IN IPO-FIRM EARNINGS MANAGEMENT BEHAVIOR IN 
THE POST-SOX PERIOD 
 77
1. INTRODUCTION 
For all public companies, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) stiffened the 
penalties for certain corporate malfeasance.  Presumably, these increased penalties would 
result in top-level executives ensuring that their company issues more accurate financial 
reports.  Cohen, Dey, and Lys (2005) support this presumption with a finding that the 
level of earnings management decreased in the period following the signing of SOX.  
Their analysis includes the population of public companies listed on Compustat and 
CRSP.  While their findings are certainly interesting, it is also important to understand 
the impact of SOX on various subsets of firms with unique, previously documented 
motivations to manage earnings. 
In this study, I examine the subset of companies undertaking an initial public 
offering (IPO) to determine whether these companies have responded similarly to the 
general population of firms in terms of restraining their earnings management behavior in 
the period following the passage of SOX.  Companies going public have a unique 
incentive to increase income around the time of the offering.  Typically, very little 
information is publicly available for these companies prior to the preparation of their 
registration statement and the dissemination of their prospectus.  As a result, investors 
place a large amount of weight on the information included in the IPO prospectus 
including, in particular, the financial statements for valuation purposes. 
At the time of the IPO, the incentive is strong to maximize the proceeds the 
company receives from the offering.  Similarly, selling shareholders want to maximize 
the proceeds they receive from the shares that they liquidate in or sometime after the 
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offering.  Thus, the company and its pre-offering owners have the incentive to 
communicate information that leads to a higher valuation of the company.  One possible 
area that involves significant judgment is the preparation of the financial statements, and 
the flexibility afforded to managers who prepare GAAP-based financial statements 
provides a potential opportunity for insiders to use discretion to affect IPO-firm earnings 
and, in turn, the stock price. 
Counteracting these incentives is the potential liability under the Securities Act of 
1933 (the ’33 Act) for the company, its officers and directors, its underwriters, and its 
auditors.  Interestingly, however, empirical evidence suggests that, on average, IPO-firm 
managers take advantage of the opportunity to make income-increasing judgments in the 
financial statements around the time of the IPO (DuCharme, Malatesta, and Sefcik 2001; 
DuCharme, Malatesta, and Sefcik 2004; Friedlan 1994; Teoh, Welch, and Wong 1998; 
Teoh, Wong, and Rao 1998).  Furthermore, DuCharme, Malatesta, and Sefcik (2004) and 
Teoh, Wong, and Rao (1998) provide support for the argument that this evidence is at 
least partially explained by opportunistic earnings manipulation.  It is this behavior, in 
spite of the increased liability, that makes it interesting to examine whether the SOX 
effect documented by Cohen, Dey, and Lys (2005) holds around the time of the IPO.  
This study will shed light on the question of whether IPO-firm managers, who, on 
average, were not previously deterred by the potential for increased liability, respond to 
the changes brought about in the post-SOX environment and whether they respond 
similarly to non-IPO-firm managers.  Said differently, this paper addresses whether SOX 
has reigned in the opportunistic financial reporting behavior of the past for companies 
undertaking an IPO. 
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The results suggest that IPO firms experience a significant decrease in earnings 
management after the passage of SOX.  Furthermore, the findings provide evidence that 
this decrease is larger than that of the population of non-IPO firms and that average post-
SOX discretionary accruals for IPO firms are not statistically different from those of non-
IPO firms.  I also find that there are a number of significant differences between the 
characteristics of pre- and post-SOX IPOs.  After controlling for these differences, the 
significant decrease in discretionary accruals in the post-SOX period remains.  While 
these results suggest that the main findings are not sensitive to controlling for changes in 
the characteristics examined between the pre- and post-SOX periods, I am unable to 
explicitly control for the possible selection bias resulting from the decisions of certain 
firms to remain private after SOX. 
This study contributes to the literature in a number of ways.  First, this paper 
might be of interest to regulators by providing documentation of the effects SOX has had 
on the financial reporting behavior of smaller firms around the time they go public as 
more than 75 percent of the sample companies meet the market value definition of 
smaller public companies as defined by the Advisory Committee on Smaller Public 
Companies (2006).  Furthermore, I provide evidence that the results for these companies 
may drive the results that I observe for the entire sample. 
Second, the examination of the earnings management behavior of IPOs in the 
post-SOX period relative to the pre-SOX period is appealing to investors because prior 
literature suggests that earnings management is more prevalent in IPO firms than in the 
general population of public companies (Friedlan 1994) and that this behavior tends to 
attract shareholder lawsuits (DuCharme, Malatesta, and Sefcik 2004).  To the extent that 
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earnings management in newly public companies has decreased, this might suggest that 
the post-SOX environment is reducing the post-offering wealth losses to IPO investors, a 
possible topic for future research. 
This paper is organized as follows.  The next section discusses the relevant 
literature and discusses the research question that I address.  I discuss the sample and 
outline the research design in the third section.  Section 4 discusses the results, and 
Section 5 provides some additional analyses.  The last section concludes with a summary. 
 
2. BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
IPOs and Earnings Management 
The goal of any public security offering is for the company and its owners who 
are selling shares to receive the highest possible value in exchange for the securities sold.  
Empirical evidence suggests that earnings are value relevant for IPOs (DuCharme, 
Malatesta, and Sefcik 2001; Ritter 1984).  To the extent that earnings are one of the 
primary measures used to value these firms, the issuer selling securities has a strong 
financial incentive to increase pre-issuance earnings and, thereby, maximize its share 
price at the time of issuance.  DuCharme, Malatesta, and Sefick (2001) provide evidence 
that, after controlling for cash flows from operations, pre-IPO accruals (both 
discretionary and non-discretionary) are positively associated with the initial value of the 
IPO.  These results suggest that total accounting earnings have incremental explanatory 
power above cash flows in an IPO-valuation setting and that the income effects of 
discretionary accruals tend to be included in the initial IPO valuation. 
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U.S. GAAP requires managers to use discretion when deciding between relatively 
conservative or aggressive applications of accounting principles.  Additionally, 
accounting standards during the sample period provided IPO-firm managers with a 
unique opportunity to retroactively change accounting methods without the normal 
reporting requirements (APB 1971, paragraph 29).1  Companies changing accounting 
methods would typically be required to report the cumulative effect of a change in 
accounting principle as a separate item in the calculation of net income.  The exemption 
for IPO firms, however, allows managers to change accounting principles by simply 
retroactively restating all pre-issuance financial statements.  Thus, in addition to the 
incentive to make income-increasing decisions to maximize the share price, IPO-firm 
managers also had the ability to do so because of the unique exceptions to the accounting 
rules that apply to companies undertaking an IPO.  Neill and Pourciau (1995) study 
accounting choice in the IPO setting and conclude that the choice of income-increasing 
inventory costing and depreciation methods are associated with the receipt of higher 
offering proceeds.  They do, however, note that these decisions are not necessarily 
problematic because these choices are within the boundaries of GAAP. 
Other studies examine the prevalence of earnings management behavior at the 
time of the offering by estimating discretionary accruals.  Friedlan (1994) finds income 
increasing discretionary accruals in the financial statements issued closest to but before 
the offering date.  Consistent with Friedlan (1994), a number of studies document 
                                                 
1 Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 154, Accounting Changes and Error Corrections, 
supersedes APB Opinion 20 for accounting changes and error corrections that occur in fiscal years 
beginning after December 15, 2005.  This new standard does not include the exemption allowing offering 
firms to retroactively restate prior periods without the normal reporting requirements of a change in 
accounting principle. 
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significantly positive abnormal accruals and earnings in the IPO year (DuCharme, 
Malatesta, and Sefcik 2004; Teoh, Welch, and Wong 1998; Teoh, Wong, and Rao 1998) 
and in the year before the IPO (DuCharme, Malatesta, and Sefcik 2001).  Teoh, Wong, 
and Rao (1998) also show that, along with earnings, abnormal accruals decrease over the 
years subsequent to the IPO suggesting that managers increase IPO-year earnings to a 
level that is not sustainable in the future.  Teoh, Welch, and Wong (1998) and 
DuCharme, Malatesta, and Sefcik (2001) find that firms with higher levels of 
discretionary accruals around the time of the IPO experience worse post-issuance stock 
market performance than IPO firms with lower levels of discretionary accruals. 
One explanation for the results mentioned above is that managers 
“opportunistically” manipulate earnings upward during the periods surrounding IPOs and 
that these firms receive a higher share price for the shares issued (DuCharme, Malatesta, 
and Sefcik 2001; DuCharme, Malatesta, and Sefcik 2004; Friedlan 1994; Teoh, Welch, 
and Wong 1998; Teoh, Wong, and Rao 1998).  The opportunism argument is that 
investors fail to account for the earnings manipulation by reducing the price they pay to 
invest.  As the positive accruals reverse over the years after the IPO, however, the 
earnings growth of these firms is not large enough to counteract the negative effect of 
these reversals.  As a result, the high discretionary accrual firms’ stock prices must adjust 
to the lower than expected growth. 
Another possible explanation for the positive association between abnormal 
accruals and IPO offer value is that these accruals are a mechanism that managers use to 
communicate legitimate private information to the market (DuCharme, Malatesta, and 
Sefcik 2001; DuCharme, Malatesta, and Sefcik 2004).  As a result, investors are willing 
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to pay a higher price to purchase the shares at the time of the offering.  A third possible 
explanation for these results is that the models used to estimate abnormal accruals do so 
with error (Beneish 1998; Soffer 2001).  The results of Teoh, Wong, and Rao (1998) and 
DuCharme, Malatesta, and Sefcik (2004) provide evidence on which of these competing 
explanations most likely explains the results of previous research, which I discuss in the 
next section. 
Managerial Opportunism 
Teoh, Wong, and Rao (1998) supplement their discretionary accrual tests with a 
comparison of the allowance for bad debts and depreciation methods between matched 
pairs of their IPO-sample companies and non-IPO control firms matched on industry and 
return on sales.  Their depreciation results suggest that the majority of the IPO companies 
use similar methods as those of the control firms.  However, they do find that when the 
IPO-firm depreciation methods deviate from those of the matched company, the IPO 
firms tend to choose income-increasing methods.  With respect to the allowance for bad 
debts, Teoh, Wong, and Rao (1998) document that their sample companies tend to under-
reserve for bad debts in the year before and the year of the offering, but that this 
difference disappears the year after the IPO.  These results provide some evidence in 
favor of the opportunism explanation. 
DuCharme, Malatesta, and Sefcik (2004) test the association between 
discretionary accruals, litigation, and settlements for IPO firms.  They document a 
negative relation between discretionary accruals and post-issue returns and that these 
lower post-issue returns are associated with an increased probability of shareholder 
lawsuits.  Furthermore, they find that higher levels of discretionary accruals (in absolute 
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dollars) are associated with higher settlements (in absolute dollars).  DuCharme, 
Malatesta, and Sefcik (2004, 47) conclude that “this evidence strongly supports the 
opportunism hypothesis.”  Furthermore, these results also provide evidence that, in the 
IPO context, discretionary accrual models detect behavior that can result in an increased 
probability of litigation against the firm. 
Liability for Earnings Management 
Section 11 of the ’33 Act outlines the unique legal ramifications that govern the 
information disclosed in the prospectus.  “To promote full and honest disclosure to 
investors, §11 loosens many of the common law elements and purposely puts fear in the 
hearts of potential defendants in the hope of creating a diligent pack of ‘information 
watchdogs’” (Palmiter 2002, 173).  Section 11 allows investors to sue if the registration 
statement contained material misstatements or omissions as long as the investors did not 
have knowledge of these misstatements or omissions.  Furthermore, the burden of proof 
in such cases rests with the defendants who might include the issuer, the executives or 
anyone else who signs the registration statement, the directors, the underwriters, and the 
accountants or other experts who allow their opinion to be included in the registration 
statement. 
While the ’33 Act only applies to companies offering securities, the liability 
provisions of and rules promulgated under the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 (the 
’34 Act) apply to all public companies regardless of whether or not these companies 
recently issued securities.  Section 10(b) of the ’34 Act and Rule 10b-5 promulgated 
under the ’34 Act (the “anti-fraud provisions”) provide the liability provisions for fraud.  
Unlike the Section 11 liability, the anti-fraud provisions place the burden of proof on the 
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plaintiff.  Other differences include the Rule 10b-5 requirements that the defendant 
intended to deceive, that the plaintiff relied on the information in a securities transaction, 
and that the reliance resulted in a loss.  Thus, the threshold for liability under Section 11 
of the ’33 Act for IPOs is much lower than the anti-fraud provisions for all public 
companies. 
SOX stiffened the penalties for certain corporate malfeasance.  Under Section 304 
of SOX, for example, the CEO and CFO of companies required to restate financial 
statements due to misconduct must reimburse the issuer for (1) any bonuses, incentive-
based compensation, or equity-based compensation earned and (2) any profits earned by 
selling securities during the 12-month period following the filing of those financial 
statements.  Other noteworthy provisions of SOX relating to increased penalties include 
the requirement that the CEO and CFO provide signed certifications as to the fairness of 
the financial statements and an outline of the criminal penalties for providing false 
certifications (Sections 302 and 906), the increased statute of limitations for bringing 
securities fraud actions (Section 804), the addition of securities fraud to the list of 
criminal activities listed in the U.S. Code (Section 807), the ability of the SEC to prohibit 
securities laws violators from serving as directors or executive officers of an issuer 
(Section 1105), and the increased criminal penalties under the ’34 Act (Section 1106).  It 
is certainly reasonable to think that these stiffer penalties might result in top-level 
executives ensuring that their company issues more accurate financial reports. 
Cohen, Dey, and Lys (2005) provide evidence that earnings management has 
decreased in the post-SOX world.  They find that the average level of earnings 
management decreased in the period following the signing of SOX for a broad sample of 
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public companies.  As such, these companies do not all have the same motivation to 
manage earnings.  Firms undertaking an IPO, on the other hand, have unique incentives 
around the time of the offering to use discretion to record income increasing adjustments, 
and prior literature suggests that managers act on these incentives (DuCharme, Malatesta, 
and Sefcik 2001; DuCharme, Malatesta, and Sefcik 2004; Friedlan 1994; Teoh, Welch, 
and Wong 1998; Teoh, Wong, and Rao 1998). 
As a result, I examine the subset of IPO companies to understand how IPO-firm 
earnings management compares to that of the general population of firms in the post-
SOX period.  In spite of the significantly more stringent liability provisions for firms 
undertaking an offering, the unique incentive to increase income around the time of the 
offering appears to lead IPO-firm managers to record opportunistic accruals in this setting 
(DuCharme, Malatesta, and Sefcik 2004; Teoh, Wong, and Rao 1998).  This paper 
addresses whether the changes in the post-SOX environment have restrained the 
opportunistic financial reporting behavior for companies undertaking an IPO.  That is, 
this study examines whether IPO-firm managers, who, on average, were not previously 
deterred by the potential for increased liability, respond to the changes brought about in 
the post-SOX period and whether these managers respond similarly to non-IPO-firm 
managers. 
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3. RESEARCH DESIGN 
Discretionary Accruals Estimation 
 I use a modified version of the Jones (1991) model to estimate discretionary 
accruals, my proxy for earnings management.  The Jones (1991) model suggests that the 
expected level of accruals is a function of the change in revenues and the level of 
property, plant, and equipment.  I calculate total accruals for all Compustat firms using 
equation (2) from Hribar and Collins (2002, 109) as follows: 
,,,, tjtjtj CFOPSEBXITACC −=        (1) 
where j and t are firm and time subscripts, respectively, and TACC equals total accruals, 
EBXI equals income before extraordinary items from the statement of cash flows 
(DATA123), CFOPS equals net cash flows from operating activities adjusted for 
extraordinary items and discontinued operations (DATA308 – DATA124). 
I estimate non-discretionary accruals using the cross-sectional method outlined in 
DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994) and an accounts receivable adjustment as outlined in 
DeFond and Park (1997).  This method groups all companies with sufficient Compustat 
data with other companies from the same two-digit SIC code in the years in which 
earnings management is hypothesized and estimates non-discretionary accruals using the 
following equation:2 
                                                 
2 Two-digit SIC codes group old- and new-economy firms together.  To subdivide companies into old- and 
new-economy groups, I use the new-economy definitions from Murphy (2003).  This affects the two-digit 
SIC code groups listed below.  Companies in the four-digit SIC code groups included in parentheses are 
considered new-economy companies, while all other four-digit SIC code groups are not. The affected 
groups are as follows: 35 (3570, 3571, 3572, 3576, and 3577), 36 (3661 and 3674), 48 (4812 and 4813), 50 
(5045), 59 (5961), and 73 (7370, 7371, 7372, and 7373). 
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where j and t are firm and time subscripts, respectively, and TACC equals total accruals 
from equation (1), A equals total assets (DATA6), Sales∆ equals the change in revenues 
(DATA12) from the prior period, AR∆ equals the change in receivables (DATA2) from 
the prior period, and PPE equals the level of gross property, plant, and equipment 
(DATA7).3  I estimate the model for industries with at least 20 observations. 
Discretionary accruals for the sample firms are then calculated using the estimates 
from equation (2): 
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where j and t are firm and time subscripts, respectively, and DA equals discretionary 
accruals and each  represents the industry-specific coefficient estimated from equation 
(2).  Thus, DAj,t is basically the residual from equation (2). 
βˆ
 Finally, I adjust the discretionary accruals calculated in equation (3) using a 
portfolio approach employed in prior literature (e.g., Ashbaugh, LaFond, and Mayhew 
2003; Kasznik 1999; and Klein 2002).  Kothari, Leone, and Wasley (2005) demonstrate 
that adjusting for the discretionary accruals of similarly performing firms can correct for 
the misspecification of discretionary accrual models previously documented for 
companies with extreme performance (see e.g., Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney 1995).  I 
adjust for performance by first assigning the sample companies to a return on sales (ROS) 
                                                 
3 Following Teoh, Welch, and Wong (1998) and Teoh, Wong, and Rao (1998), I estimate equation (2) by 
excluding all sample firms and all firms that conducted an SEO in the respective year from the estimation 
sample.  Given that Compustat now includes pre-IPO data, I also exclude IPO companies during the pre-
IPO period. 
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decile.  Each decile contains firms from the same industry with sufficient Compustat data 
to calculate discretionary accruals and ROS.  I create the deciles by sorting the firms in 
each industry based on their ROS value in a given year and assigning them each to one of 
10 groups based on their ROS ranking.  Finally, I calculate the median discretionary 
accruals for each decile (excluding the sample companies), and I subtract this value from 
the sample firms’ discretionary accrual estimate.  While Kothari, Leone, and Wasley 
(2005) use return on assets (ROA) to measure performance, I use ROS because, as Teoh, 
Wong, and Rao (1998) highlight, ROA in the IPO year should be lower because the IPO 
proceeds would immediately increase assets, whereas IPO proceeds are less likely to 
have an immediate impact on sales.  The performance adjusted discretionary accrual is 
calculated as follows: 
,, ,, tDecileROStjtj MedianDADAPADA −=       (4) 
where j and t are firm and time subscripts, respectively, and PADA equals performance-
adjusted discretionary accruals, DAj,t equals discretionary accruals calculated using 
equation (3) for the sample firm, and MedianDAROS Decile,t equals the median discretionary 
accrual for the given ROS decile. 
Sample Selection 
The sample of IPO firms comes from the Securities Data Corporation (SDC) New 
Issues Database, which includes firm-commitment IPOs.  I include companies that 
completed common stock IPOs during the period between 2000 and 2004.  The sample 
excludes ADRs, REITs (SIC code 6798), partnerships, closed-end funds, unit offers, 
financial institutions (SIC codes 6000-6199), and insurance companies (SIC codes 6300-
6411).  I exclude financial institutions and insurance companies because the accrual 
 90
composition for these firms is unique to these industries.  These restrictions result in 683 
IPOs.  I further restrict the sample to include firms with sufficient financial data available 
on the 2004 Compustat Industrial, Full Coverage, and Research files.  Seventy-four 
companies do not have Compustat data for some of the control variables, and 30 firms 
have insufficient data to estimate discretionary accruals.  Twenty-four companies have 
zero sales, which results in an undefined ROS value for performance matching.  The IPO-
year data for 13 companies is 2005, and this data is not available on the 2004 Compustat 
update.  Twelve companies are not on Compustat, and 11 companies are missing 
EDGAR filings.  Finally, I exclude eight firms because they have discretionary accrual 
values greater than (less than) the 99th (1st) percentile and were not excluded for other 
reasons, and four firms from industries with fewer than 20 observations.  The final 
sample includes 507 companies.  Table 1 provides a summary of the sample selection 
process.4 
The Effect of the post-SOX Environment on IPO-firm Earnings Management 
 This study will examine whether, on average, IPO-firm managers who were not 
previously deterred by the potential for increased liability responded to the changes 
brought about in the post-SOX period and whether these managers respond similarly to 
non-IPO-firm managers.  In Part 1 of this dissertation, I find that IPO-firm earnings 
management is confined to the IPO year and, furthermore, that this behavior is 
concentrated in the firms that file a new 10-K before the lockup period expires.  This 
finding is consistent with managers manipulating earnings in the new financial 
information they provide to the market in anticipation of the lockup period expiring to 
                                                 
4 All Tables and Figures for Part 2 are included under the heading Part 2: Appendix. 
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help increase the share price before the managers sell their shares.5  Therefore, I estimate 
equation (5) using OLS for IPO-year financial data to address this research question: 
,             
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 (5) 
The dependent variable, PADA, is the performance-adjusted discretionary accrual 
estimate from equation (4).   The test variable, SOX, equals “1” if the IPO firm files its 
first 10-K after July 30, 2002, the date that SOX was signed into law, and “0” otherwise.  
PRELOCK is a measure of whether or not the company provides new annual financial 
data to the market before the lockup agreement expires.  It equals “1” if the company 
files its first 10-K before its lockup agreement expires, and “0” otherwise.  I then interact 
this variable with SOX to allow the relation between SOX and PADA to change based on 
whether the 10-K financial statements are filed before or after insiders can begin trading. 
I expect a negative relation between the presence of large auditors and PADA.  
DeAngelo (1981) argues that audit firm size and audit quality are positively related.  
Heninger (2001) finds a positive relation between income increasing abnormal accruals 
and the probability that an auditor is sued.  Because SOX increased the scrutiny on audit 
firms, auditors would presumably require their clients to make more adjustments for 
discretionary accruals after the passage of SOX.  I measure auditor size using an indicator 
variable, AUDITOR, which equals “1” if Compustat (DATA149) indicates the presence 
                                                 
5 Lockups are agreements between the lead underwriter and company insiders that restrict these insiders 
from selling shares for a certain period of time following the offering.  This period is usually 180 days and 
almost all offerings have a lockup arrangement. 
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of a Big N auditor for the firm-year, and “0” otherwise.  I expect a negative coefficient on 
AUDITOR.6 
The other control variables included in equation (5) are factors commonly 
controlled for in recent earnings management studies (e.g., Ashbaugh, LaFond, and 
Mayhew 2003; Butler, Leone, and Willenborg 2004; Menon and Williams 2004).  CFO 
represents cash flows from operations (DATA308) at the end of the period scaled by total 
assets (DATA6) at the end of the period.  SIZE equals the natural log of market value (the 
share price multiplied by the number of shares outstanding [DATA199*DATA25]) at the 
end of the IPO year.  MKTBK is the market value of equity divided by the book value of 
assets (DATA6), all at the end of the period.  LEV is total debt (DATA9+DATA34) 
divided by total assets (DATA6), all at the end of the period.  FCOND is Zmijewski’s 
(1984) financial condition index, which controls for financial distress.7  LOSS equals “1” 
if the company had a net loss (DATA172) during the period, and “0” otherwise.  I also 
include time control indicator variables, TimeControls, to control for possible systematic 
differences in discretionary accruals during each period. 
 
                                                 
6 One example of how SOX increased scrutiny for auditors is that it established the Public Company 
Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB), which replaces the peer review process that was used for quality 
control in the past. 
7 This measure is calculated using the following variables and coefficient estimates that Zmijewski (1984) 
obtained by using a weighted exogenous sample maximum likelihood method to estimate his probit model: 
LIABS)*(CASSTS/C.*(LEV)-.ASSETS)*(EBXI.-. 1045/638034 +− , 
where EBXI equals income before extraordinary items from the statement of cash flows (DATA123), 
ASSETS equals total assets (DATA6), LEV equals total debt (DATA9+DATA34) divided by total assets 
(DATA6), CASSTS equals total current assets (DATA4), and CLIABS equals total current liabilities 
(DATA5), all measured at the end of the period. 
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4. RESULTS 
Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2 presents the distribution of sample firms by year.  Panel A shows that the 
most active sample year for IPOs is 2000, when 258 companies went public.  Fifty-one 
pre-SOX IPOs completed an offering in 2001, and four post-SOX IPOs went public 
during 2001.  Forty-eight companies went public in 2002, 43 in 2003, and 103 in 2004.  
Panel B indicates that, in terms of the 10-K dates, 233 include 2000 data, 71 include 2001 
data, five include 2002 data filed before July 30, 2002, and 46 include 2002 data filed 
after July 30, 2002.  Forty-five companies include 2003 data, and 107 include 2004 data. 
Table 3 provides the variable definitions, and Table 4 presents descriptive 
statistics for the control variables in the IPO year.  Virtually all of the sample companies 
have a Big N auditor in both the pre- and post-SOX periods.  On average, cash flows 
from operations represent -11 percent of assets before SOX, which improves to two 
percent after SOX.  The median market value at the end of the first fiscal year in the pre-
SOX period is $351.7 million, and the median market value in the post-SOX period is 
$352.4 million.  The mean market to book ratio is 3.11 and 2.65 for these respective 
periods.  Total debt represents nine percent of assets in the pre-SOX period and 18 
percent of assets for the post-SOX offerings, and the average probability of bankruptcy is 
low in both periods.  Finally, 72 percent and 41 percent of the sample had a net loss in the 
pre- and post-SOX periods, respectively. 
Table 5 presents the summary statistics for the dependent variable, performance-
adjusted discretionary accruals, from the first 10-K filed after the offering.  Overall, 
average pre-SOX discretionary accruals are significantly positive for the entire sample 
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and for each group of companies defined based on when they file their first 10-K relative 
to the expiration of the lockup (p < 0.01 in each case).  The post-SOX discretionary 
accruals are not statistically significant overall or for either group of PRELOCK 
companies.  The results in terms of the medians are generally consistent with those of the 
means except that the median for the companies that file their first 10-K after the lockup 
expires is not statistically significant. 
Table 6 presents univariate tests of differences between the pre- and post-SOX 
discretionary accruals presented in Table 5.  The two-sample t-tests and the non-
parametric Wilcoxon tests indicate that discretionary accruals have decreased 
significantly.  These findings suggest that IPO-year discretionary accruals are 
significantly lower in the post-SOX period than those in the pre-SOX period, providing 
preliminary support that IPO-firm earnings management has decreased in the post-SOX 
environment. 
Multivariate Tests 
The test variables in equation (5) differ depending on whether the firm files its 
first 10-K before or after the lockup expiration.  For the companies that file their first 10-
K after the lockup expiration, the coefficient on the SOX variable provides an estimate of 
the difference in average discretionary accruals between the pre- and post-SOX periods.  
The coefficient on SOX + PRELOCK*SOX provides an estimate of the difference in 
average discretionary accruals between the pre- and post-SOX periods for the companies 
that filed their first 10-K before the lockup expiration.  Significantly negative coefficient 
estimates for these relations would indicate that, on average, IPO-firm earnings 
management has decreased in the post-SOX period after controlling for other 
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determinants of discretionary accruals.  An insignificant coefficient, on the other hand, 
would suggest that average discretionary accruals are not significantly different between 
the pre- and post-SOX periods. 
Table 7 presents the results from estimating equation (5) using OLS.  In equation 
(5) I am interested in testing the SOX policy effect after controlling for any non-policy-
related differences in earnings management behavior in each individual year.  The 
problem with including the TimeControls along with the SOX variable, however, is that 
these variables are defined based on the date of the financial data included in the model.  
Thus, by definition, the SOX variable and the TimeControls are highly correlated.  This 
high correlation can lead to inflated standard errors and, in turn, lower t-statistics.  
Omitting the TimeControls, on the other hand, could lead to omitted variables bias.  As a 
result, I estimate the model including and excluding the TimeControls, and I report the 
results side-by-side in Table 7. 
The overall F statistic for each model is significant (p < 0.01) and the model 
adjusted R2 is 0.06 for Model 1 and 0.054 for Model 2.  In general, the coefficients in the 
two models are similar in terms of signs and significance.  More importantly, the 
coefficient on the SOX variable is very similar in both models, and this coefficient is 
significantly negative in Model 2, but insignificant in Model 1.  Given the general 
consistency in coefficients in each of the models, I omit the TimeControls throughout the 
rest of the paper. 
As discussed above, the coefficient on SOX is significantly negative (p < 0.10).  
Furthermore, the estimate of SOX + SOX*PRELOCK is significantly negative (p < 0.10).  
These findings suggest that, compared to the pre-SOX period, average discretionary 
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accruals are significantly lower for IPO firms in the post-SOX period, regardless of 
whether the company filed its first 10-K before or after the lockup expiration.  Taken 
together with the univariate tests discussed above, the results provide evidence that IPO-
firm earnings management has decreased in the post-SOX environment.  Furthermore, 
the findings indicate that this change has resulted in a reduction in the magnitude of 
average IPO-firm discretionary accruals from being significantly positive to being 
indistinguishable from zero. 
 The results for the control variables suggest that CFO and SIZE are negatively 
related to PADA (p < 0.05 and p < 0.10, respectively).  I find no significant relation 
between PADA and the presence of a Big N auditor, the market to book ratio, leverage, 
financial condition, or the presence of a loss. 
 
5. ADDITIONAL ANALYSES 
IPO Composition 
The results from estimating equation (5) are consistent with a change in earnings 
management behavior for the companies that file their first 10-K after the passage of 
SOX.  An alternative explanation for these findings is that the companies choosing to go 
public in the pre-SOX period were more likely to manage earnings, and that these types 
of companies are no longer going public.  While employing a Heckman selection model 
would control for this alternative explanation (and the potential selection bias due to 
omitting this control), I am unable to run such a model.  Estimating a Heckman model 
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requires data for firms that go public and those that do not.  Given the lack of available 
data for private firms that decide to remain private, I cannot estimate this model. 
Despite this limitation, I still attempt to address this issue by first testing for 
differences in a number of IPO-firm characteristics for offerings before and after SOX.  I 
then compare the industry composition of the IPO sample between these two periods.  
Finally, I add each measure that is significantly different between the pre- and post-SOX 
periods to equation (5), and I re-estimate the model. 
Table 8 presents the means and medians for a number of characteristics.  First, I 
test for significant differences in a number of different size measures.  I find no 
statistically significant differences in mean total assets, sales, or market value at the end 
of the IPO year.  With the exception of sales (p < 0.01), the results of the non-parametric 
tests are consistent with those of the t-tests.  Net income (market value at the end of the 
first trading day), on the other hand, demonstrates a significant increase (decrease) 
between the periods (p < 0.01 except for the t-test for net income for which p < 0.05). 
The next group of variables is related to financing.  As shown in Table 8, (and 
also in Table 4) the mean (median) debt to assets ratio (LEV) for pre-SOX offerings is 
nine percent (two percent) which increases to 18 percent (three percent).  Both the t-test 
and Wilcoxon test suggest that these increases are statistically significant (p < 0.01 and p 
< 0.05, respectively).  The changes in the offering price and the number of shares offered 
are not significantly different between the periods.  Finally, underpricing drastically 
decreased from an average (median) of 49 percent (25 percent) of the offering price in the 
pre-SOX period to 11 percent (nine percent) in the post-SOX period (both significant at p 
< 0.01). 
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In terms of operating performance, I examine sales growth, industry-adjusted 
return on sales, and industry-adjusted return on assets.  The results suggest that 
significant differences exist between the periods for each of these three measures of 
performance (except for the mean for INDROS).  Because all of the distributions are left 
skewed, I focus on the medians for these measures.8  The trend for sales growth is 
negative, with a significant decrease from 90 percent to 30 percent (p < 0.01).  In the pre-
SOX period, the median firm has a net loss that represents 39 percent of sales and five 
percent of assets, and both measures show significant increases (p < 0.01) in the post-
SOX period. 
The next category includes exchange listing statistics.  The first three items show 
the percentages of firms that went public on the NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ.  The 
proportions show a significant increase for listings on the NYSE from 10 percent to 23 
percent (p < 0.01) between the pre- and post-SOX periods, respectively, and a significant 
decrease in the proportion of NASDAQ IPOs from 88 percent to 74 percent, respectively 
(p < 0.01).  AMEX listings remained constant at two percent during both periods. 
The final grouping includes a number of other characteristics.  The average 
(median) age of the offerings at the time of the IPO in the pre-SOX period are 
approximately 11 (six) years, and these values increase to approximately 18 (eight) years 
(p < 0.01 for both parametric and non-parametric tests).  I measure IPO age as the 
number of years between the IPO founding date and the year of the offering using the 
Field-Ritter dataset of company founding dates when available (Field and Karpoff 2002; 
                                                 
8 The unusual values for both the ROS and SGROW measures are due to companies that have very low 
sales numbers in the denominator of each calculation.  
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Loughran and Ritter 2004).  This data is available on Jay Ritter’s website (Ritter).  For 
the firms not included in Field-Karpoff dataset, I obtain the founding dates from Dun & 
Bradstreet’s Million Dollar Directory, the company’s website, or the offering prospectus.  
The mean (median) level of institutional ownership [obtained from the Thomson 
Financial CDA/Spectrum Institutional (13f) Holdings database] also increases from 29 
percent (26 percent) before SOX to 39 percent (34 percent) after SOX (p < 0.01 for both 
the t-test and Wilcoxon test).  The proportion of firms with reputable underwriters (74 
percent in the pre-SOX period and 77 percent in the post-SOX period) is not significantly 
different between the periods.  To control for underwriter reputation, I use the Loughran 
and Ritter (2004) underwriter rankings list that has been updated through 2004 and is 
available on Jay Ritter’s website (Ritter).9  The proportion of venture capital backed firms 
(66 percent in the pre-SOX period and 55 percent in the post-SOX period) and the 
proportion of firms with analyst research coverage on the First Call Historical Database 
(76 percent in the pre-SOX period and 92 percent in the post-SOX period) are 
significantly different between the two periods (p < 0.01 in both cases). 
Table 9, Panel A, examines the change in industry composition between the 
periods before and after SOX using industry groupings from Teoh, Wong, and Rao 
(1998).  For each period, the table includes (1) the number of IPO firms in each industry 
group and (2) the number of these firms as a percentage of the total number of either pre- 
or post-SOX offerings.  The categories with large changes include the Electronic 
Equipment and Computer Equipment & Services categories.  Upon further examination 
                                                 
9 This list includes the following underwriters: ABN Amro, Banc of America Securities, Bear Stearns, 
Citigroup, CIBC, Credit Suisse First Boston, Deutsche Bank, Goldman Sachs, HSBC Securities, JP 
Morgan, Lazard, Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch, Morgan Stanley, Salomon Smith Barney, Sandler 
O’Neill Partners, Thomas Weisel Partners LLC, and UBS. 
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of the data, the changes in these industries occur mainly in the New Economy two-digit 
SIC code groups. 
Table 9, Panel B, confirms this finding and indicates that the percentage of New 
Economy offerings decreased from 44 percent in the pre-SOX period to 28 percent in the 
post-SOX period.  Untabulated Pearson and Likelihood-ratio χ2 tests of independence 
between the categories suggest that the type of firm is not independent of the period of 
the offering (p < 0.01 for both tests). 
The results of this analysis suggest that pre- and post-SOX IPO firms differ on a 
number of dimensions including net income, market value at the end of the first trading 
day, leverage, underpricing, sales growth, industry adjusted return on assets, industry 
adjusted return on sales, listing on the NYSE, listing on the NASDAQ, firm age at the 
time of the IPO, institutional ownership, venture capital backing, and analyst research 
coverage.  Furthermore, the mix of companies between the New and Old Economy 
grouping has also changed.  I include each of these variables in equation (5), and I re-
estimate the model.10   The untabulated results from this analysis suggest that, after 
controlling for the changes in the composition of firms going public after SOX, I 
continue to detect a significant decrease in average IPO-firm discretionary accruals in the 
post-SOX period.  This result holds for the PRELOCK = 0 firms (p < 0.10) and the 
PRELOCK = 1 firms (p < 0.05).  Of the additional variables that I include in equation (5), 
only industry adjusted return on assets and venture capital backing are statistically 
significant, both of which are positive (p < 0.05).  While these findings suggest that the 
                                                 
10 Before running this analysis, I take the natural log of the market value after the first trading day and also 
the firm age at the time of the IPO. 
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main results are not sensitive to controlling for changes in the characteristics examined 
between the pre- and post-SOX periods, this does not eliminate the possibility that the 
results are driven by selection bias.  Future research might assess this alternative 
explanation more formally. 
Comparison to the Population 
In this section I test whether the results that I document for IPOs in Table 7 differ 
from those of non-IPO firms in the overall population.  To test this question I run the 
following model using panel methods on the population of Compustat firms with 
sufficient data for the years 2000 – 2004: 
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where the dependent variable is the absolute value of PADA because some firms in the 
population will have the motivation to record income-increasing accruals while other 
firms will have the motivation to record income-decreasing accruals.  Measuring the 
dependent variable as the absolute value of PADA captures the magnitude of 
discretionary accruals, regardless of whether they are income-increasing or income-
decreasing accruals. 
The independent variables are as previously defined in equation (5) except for 
IPO and LISTED.  IPO is an indicator variable that equals “1” if the firm-year 
observation comes from the first 10-K filed for IPO firms, and “0” otherwise.  LISTED 
equals “1” if the company was listed on NYSE or AMEX, or quoted on NASDAQ, and 
“0” otherwise.  Shortly after the signing of SOX, the major U.S. stock exchanges adopted 
more stringent governance rules as a part of their listing standards (see NYSE 2003; 
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NASD 2003).  These changes might have an effect on the earnings management of listed 
firms above that of SOX.  As a result, I control for whether Compustat identifies the 
respective firm as being listed on NYSE or AMEX, or quoted on NASDAQ.  I expect a 
negative relation between LISTED and PADA. 
Equation (6) also includes an interaction between SOX and IPO.  The  
coefficient measures the pre-SOX difference in the magnitude of average discretionary 
accruals between IPO and non-IPO firms.  The estimate of the 
2γ
32 γγ +  coefficient 
measures the post-SOX difference in the magnitude of average discretionary accruals 
between IPO and non-IPO firms.  As discussed earlier, average discretionary accruals for 
IPO firms tend to be positive around the time of the offering in the pre-SOX period 
(DuCharme, Malatesta, and Sefcik 2001; DuCharme, Malatesta, and Sefcik 2004; 
Friedlan 1994; Teoh, Welch, and Wong 1998; Teoh, Wong, and Rao 1998).  
Furthermore, Friedlan (1994) documents that earnings management is more prevalent for 
IPOs than for non-IPOs.  Therefore, I expect to observe a positive coefficient for . 2γ
Given the more prevalent earnings management behavior for IPOs, these firms 
would have more room to improve in the post-SOX period relative to their non-IPO 
peers.  Failure to reject the null hypothesis that 32 γγ +  = 0 would suggest that the 
magnitude of IPO-firm discretionary accruals is not significantly different from that of 
non-IPO firms in the period after SOX.  On the other hand, the evidence of positive 
discretionary accruals for IPO companies is consistent with increased potential liability 
(e.g., under the ’33 Act) not having an impact on the behavior of IPO-firm management.  
In the post-SOX period, IPO firms still face the same incentives to manage earnings 
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around the time of the offering, and the changes that have occurred might not bear high 
enough potential costs to restrain this behavior.  Evidence that 32 γγ +  > 0 would suggest 
that the magnitude of discretionary accruals remains significantly higher for IPO 
companies relative to non-IPO companies in the post-SOX period.  Finally, it is possible 
that, on average, IPO firms become more conservative than non-IPO firms, resulting in a 
smaller magnitude of post-SOX discretionary accruals than those of non-IPO firms.  A 
significantly negative joint test for 32 γγ +  would support this argument. 
Table 10 presents the results from estimating equation (6) using a fixed effects 
model.11  The overall model is highly significant (p < 0.01) and the overall R2 is 0.015.  
The coefficient estimate for  is positive and statistically significant (p < 0.01), 
providing evidence consistent with Friedlan (1994) that average discretionary accruals for 
IPO-firms are significantly higher, at least in the period before SOX.  Turning to the post-
SOX period, I fail to reject the null hypothesis that 
2γ
32 γγ +  = 0.  This result indicates that, 
in the post-SOX period, average discretionary accruals for IPO firms are not significantly 
different from those for non-IPO firms.  Thus, the difference in the magnitude of 
discretionary accruals from the pre-SOX period disappears in the post-SOX period, 
suggesting that post-SOX IPO-firm discretionary accruals are in line with those of non-
IPO firms. 
                                                 
11 The Hausman (1978) test (untabulated) provides strong evidence that the differences between the 
estimated coefficients for equation (6) using the fixed effects estimator and the random effects estimator are 
systematic (p < 0.01).  Furthermore, the test that the fixed effects are jointly equal to zero is highly 
significant (p < 0.01) and the estimated correlation between the fixed effects and the fitted values is -0.44.  
As a result, I estimate equation (6) using a fixed effects model. 
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Interestingly, the coefficient on  is not significantly different from zero 
suggesting no difference in the magnitude of discretionary accruals between the pre- and 
post-SOX period for non-IPO firms.  These results are in contrast to those of Cohen, Dey, 
and Lys (2005) who find that earnings management behavior decreased in the post-SOX 
period.  In untabulated results, I estimate equation (6) dropping the IPO variable and the 
interaction between SOX and IPO.  The coefficient on the SOX variable in this model is 
negative and statistically significant (p < 0.05), consistent with Cohen, Dey, and Lys 
(2005). 
1γ
The control variable results suggest a significantly negative relation between (1) 
cash flows from operations and (2) financial condition and the absolute value of 
discretionary accruals (p < 0.01 for both relations).  I also find a significantly positive 
relation between the magnitude of discretionary accruals and (1) SIZE and (2) leverage (p 
< 0.01 for both relations).  Finally, the results suggest that AUDITOR, LISTED, MKTBK, 
and LOSS are not significantly related to PADA. 
Alternative Definitions of the Pre- and Post- Periods 
 In the main analyses, I test for differences in discretionary accruals for IPO firms 
in the pre- and post-SOX periods.  I define these periods based on the date that the 
sample companies file their first 10-K relative to the SOX enactment date of July 30, 
2002.  In this section, I test the sensitivity of the results documented above using an 
alternative definition to see whether the decrease in discretionary accruals occurred 
before the signing of SOX.  Specifically, I discard all companies that file their first 10-K 
between October 16, 2001 and July 30, 2002.  On October 16, 2001, Enron announced 
that it was taking a $1.01 billion charge in the company’s third quarter financial 
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statements, quickly setting off a chain of events in the business world that resulted in the 
passage of SOX.  It is possible that the increased attention to the problems at Enron might 
have brought about a change in behavior before July 30, 2002. 
Fifty firms filed their first 10-K during this period.  When I re-estimate equation 
(5) excluding these 50 companies, the model remains highly significant (p < 0.01) and the 
adjusted R2 remains close to 0.06 (untabulated).  Both the SOX base effect and the 
PRELOCK*SOX interaction term are statistically significant (p < 0.05 and p < 0.10) and 
negative, suggesting that the original equation (5) results are not sensitive to the inclusion 
or exclusion of the post-Enron and pre-SOX offerings.  Thus, the fifty post-Enron and 
pre-SOX offerings are not driving my results. 
SIZE Subsets 
 Some have expressed concerns about the effects of SOX on small businesses (see 
e.g., AEA 2005).  As a result of these concerns, the SEC formed an advisory committee 
to study the effect of SOX on smaller public companies (SEC 2004), and the SEC 
delayed the effective date for the internal control requirements under Section 404 for 
smaller public companies in both March and September 2005.  More recently, the 
Advisory Committee on Smaller Public Companies (2006) recommended that the SEC 
fully exempt certain microcap (market capitalization < $128.2 million) companies from 
the Section 404 provisions entirely, and that the SEC drop the auditor attestation 
requirement for certain smallcap (market capitalization $128.2 - $787.1 million) 
companies.  While the SEC ultimately rejected these recommendations (see SEC 2006), 
the committee’s size definitions provide meaningful size groupings for me to use in this 
analysis. 
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 One hundred seven sample companies are microcap companies.  Of these 107 
companies, 80 are pre-SOX offerings and 27 are post-SOX offerings.  Two hundred 
eighty companies are smallcap companies, 157 of which are pre-SOX IPO firms and 123 
are post-SOX IPO firms.  Finally, 120 sample firms (72 pre-SOX and 48 post-SOX) are 
larger companies. 
Based on the size definitions discussed above, I estimate equation (5) with some 
modifications.  First, I include indicator variables for the microcap and smallcap 
companies, and I interact these with the SOX variable to test whether the relation between 
SOX and PADA differs based on the size of the IPO firms.  Second, to eliminate the need 
for a three-way interaction term, I exclude the PRELOCK variable and the interaction 
between SOX and PRELOCK.  This is reasonable given that the coefficients on these 
terms are not significant in any of the previous specifications.12 
The overall model is significant (p < 0.01) with an adjusted R2 of 0.07 
(untabulated).  While the SOX base effect and both of the interaction terms are not 
individually significant, the sum of the SOX base effect and the interaction between SOX 
and the microcap indicator variable is significantly negative (p < 0.10).  This suggests 
that that average discretionary accruals are significantly lower in the post-SOX period as 
compared to the pre-SOX period for the smallest IPOs.  For smallcap and larger public 
company offerings, however, I find no significant difference in pre- and post-SOX 
discretionary accruals.  The results of this analysis suggest that the significant decrease 
                                                 
12 Ideally, I would estimate equation (5) separately for the microcap, smallcap, and large public companies.   
Only one of these models is more than marginally significant suggesting a possible lack of power.  Thus, I 
pool the observations and test the differential size effects using interaction terms. 
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that I observe for post-SOX discretionary accruals is driven by the companies with an 
IPO year market capitalization of $128.2 million or less. 
Discretionary Accruals Model Specification 
 In Part 1 of this dissertation, I discuss two alternative versions of the modified 
Jones model – a scaled WLS model and an unscaled OLS model that includes a scale 
proxy variable.  The difference between these two models is that the former scales all of 
the variables in the model by lagged assets and the latter does not scale the variables but, 
instead, includes lagged assets as a control variable in the model.  In this section, I re-
estimate equation (5) using the unscaled OLS model to estimate the dependent variable, 
PADA.  The remainder of the estimation process (i.e., in terms of the variable definitions, 
performance adjustment, independent variables, and models used) is identical to that 
described in the Research Design and Results sections above. 
When I re-estimate equation (5) using the unscaled PADA measure, the 
untabulated results suggest that the overall model is only marginally significant (p = 
0.096), and the adjusted R2 is 0.031.  I fail to reject the null hypothesis that the 
coefficients on SOX and SOX*PRELOCK are significantly different from zero at 
conventional levels.  Furthermore, I find no evidence that the joint test of the sum of 
these coefficients is different from zero.  Thus, using the unscaled OLS model estimates, 
I fail to find any statistically significant differences in average discretionary accruals 
between the pre- and post-SOX periods. 
Consistent with the results in Table 7 for equation (5), I find a significantly 
negative relation between cash flows from operations and PADA.  In contrast to the 
equation (5) results using the scaled PADA measure, I find a significantly negative 
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relation between PADA and (1) FCOND and (2) LOSS (p < 0.05 in both cases) and a 
significantly positive relation between LEV and PADA (p < 0.10) using the unscaled 
measure.  Finally, SIZE is insignificant using the unscaled measure, while it is 
significantly negative using the scaled measure in equation (5). 
In summary, the conclusions drawn from testing the differences in pre- and post-
SOX discretionary accruals for IPO firms depend on whether I estimate PADA using a 
scaled or unscaled measure.  Prior literature has concluded that the scaled version of this 
model is able to detect earnings manipulation (see e.g. Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeny 
1995), while prior research has not assessed the power of the unscaled OLS specification 
in detecting this behavior.  Future research might assess the ability of the unscaled OLS 
model that includes a scale proxy in detecting earnings management. 
 
6. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
This paper examines the earnings management of IPO companies before and after 
the signing of SOX.  Despite the increased liability for firms offering securities under the 
’33 Act, previous research documents that managers record significantly positive 
discretionary accruals around the time of the IPO (DuCharme, Malatesta, and Sefcik 
2001; DuCharme, Malatesta, and Sefcik 2004; Friedlan 1994; Teoh, Welch, and Wong 
1998; Teoh, Wong, and Rao 1998).  The regulations in SOX impose stiffer penalties for 
certain corporate malfeasance that is incremental to the regulations in the ’33 Act.  As a 
result, I examine whether the new regulatory environment following the passage of SOX 
has constrained the previously documented earnings management of IPO-firm managers.  
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I also examine how the IPO-firm response compares to that of non-IPO firms 
documented by Cohen, Dey, and Lys (2005). 
I find that IPO firms experience a significant decrease in earnings management 
after the passage of SOX.  The results also provide evidence that this decrease is driven 
by the smallest public companies.  Furthermore, I provide evidence that the decrease 
results in IPO-firm discretionary accruals decreasing to levels that are indistinguishable 
from those of non-IPO firms.  Finally, I find a number of significant differences between 
the characteristics of pre- and post-SOX IPO firms.  After controlling for these 
differences, the decrease in discretionary accruals in the post-SOX period remains, 
suggesting that the results are not driven by changes in the composition of IPOs between 
the pre- and post-SOX periods.  While I attempt to dispel this possibility by controlling 
for these changes, this analysis does not completely eliminate the possibility that the 
results are driven by a selection bias that results from a change in the types of companies 
going public.  This possibility is one limitation of the current study. 
A second limitation of this study is that I use a proxy variable, discretionary 
accruals, to measure earnings management because I cannot observe IPO-firm earnings 
management behavior directly.  While I employ commonly used techniques to estimate 
accounting discretion, my proxy is likely to measure discretionary accruals with error.  
Additionally, the model does not discriminate between within GAAP adjustments and 
those that violate GAAP.  I do, however, control for misspecification in the model 
associated with extreme performance using a portfolio matching technique commonly 
used in prior literature. 
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The sensitivity tests raise another question about the discretionary accruals model 
used.  I find that the results using a discretionary accrual estimate from a scaled model 
differ from those from an unscaled model with a scale proxy.  Previous research, 
however, uses a scaled model, and the literature documents that discretionary accruals 
estimated using a scaled model are associated with opportunistic IPO-firm behavior 
(DuCharme, Malatesta, and Sefcik 2004; Teoh, Wong, and Rao 1998).  Future research 
might further examine the ability of the unscaled OLS model that includes a scale proxy 
to detect earnings management.  Finally, another limitation is that this study does not 
directly address the effects of SOX on earnings management.  Instead, the results can 
only speak to what has happened in the post-SOX environment. 
Subject to these limitations, this paper addresses the concerns of regulators by 
providing documentation of changes in the financial reporting behavior of firms going 
public after the passage of SOX.  Examining the earnings management behavior of IPOs 
in the post-SOX period relative to the pre-SOX period might be appealing to investors 
and regulators because prior literature suggests that earnings management is more 
prevalent in IPO firms than in the general population of public companies (Friedlan 
1994) and that this behavior tends to attract shareholder lawsuits (DuCharme, Malatesta, 
and Sefcik 2004).
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TABLE 1:  SAMPLE SELECTION – PART 2 
Description
Number 
of Firms
IPOs from SDC New Issues Databasea 683       
Missing control variables (74)        
Insufficient data to estimate accruals (30)        
Sales = 0 (24)        
IPO Year is 2005 (13)        
Not on Compustat (12)        
EDGAR filing missing (11)        
Discretionary acrual outliers (8)          
Fewer than 20 companies in two-digit SIC (4)          
Total 507       
a Seven hundred six IPOs met the sample criteria using the SDC 
New Issues Database.  Of these 706 firms, however, the 
prospectuses revealed the following: three firms are unit 
offerings, three firms are limited-partnerships, two firms are 
foreign, one firm is as a closed-end fund, and one firm is a trust.  
Examination of the Compustat data for 12 other firms indicated 
that the firms were either in the insurance industry (three firms) 
or banking industry (nine firms).  Finally, one offering appeared 
twice in the SDC New Issues Database.
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TABLE 2:  SAMPLE DESCRIPTION 
Pre-
SOX
Post-
SOX Total
Panel A: IPO Calendar Year
2000 258 0 258
2001 51 4 55
2002 0 48 48
2003 0 43 43
2004 0 103 103
Total 309 198 507
Panel B: IPO-year Financial Data
2000 233 0 233
2001 71 0 71
2002 5 46 51
2003 0 45 45
2004 0 107 107
Total 309 198 507  
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TABLE 3: VARIABLE DEFINITIONS – PART 2 
Variable 
Name Variable Definition
AUDITOR = 1 if Compustat (DATA149) indicates the presence of a Big N 
auditor for the firm-year, and 0 otherwise.
CFO = cash flows from operations (DATA308) at the end of the period 
scaled by total assets (DATA6) at the end of the period.
MKTVAL = market value of equity in the IPO year calculated as price 
multiplied by the number of shares outstanding 
(DATA199*DATA25) at the end of the IPO year.
MKTBK = equity market value divided by the book value of assets 
(DATA6).
LEV = total debt (DATA9+DATA34) divided by total assets (DATA6), 
all at the end of the period.
FCOND = Zmijewski’s (1984) financial condition index, which controls for 
financial distress.
LOSS = 1 if the company had a net loss (DATA172) during the period, 
and 0 otherwise.
PRELOCK = 1 if the company filed its first 10-K before its lockup agreement 
expired, and 0 otherwise.
SOX = 1 if the company filed its first 10-K after July 30, 2002, the date 
that SOX was signed into law, and 0 otherwise.
SIZE = the natural log of MKTVAL.
Y200X = 1 if the financial data comes from the respective calendar year, 
and 0 otherwise.
PADA = performance-adjusted discretionary accruals estimated using a 
cross-sectional version of the modified-Jones model.
ASSETS = total assets at the end of the IPO year (DATA6).
SALES = total revenues for the IPO year (DATA12).
INCOME = net income for the IPO year (DATA172).
INITMVAL = market value of the offering measured on the first trading day 
from CRSP.
OFPRC = offering price per share taken from the prospectus.
OFFRSIZE = number of shares offered taken from the prospectus.
UNDPRC = percentage of underpricing measured as the percentage change 
from the offering price to the closing share price at the end of the 
first trading day.
SGROW = sales growth between the pre-IPO period and the IPO year.  
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TABLE 3: CONTINUED 
Variable 
Name Variable Definition
INDROS = return on sales for each firm adjusted for the median return on 
sales for the respective two-digit SIC code industry.
INDROA = return on assets for each firm adjusted for the median return on 
assets for the respective two-digit SIC code industry.
NYSE = 1 if the firm is listed on the NYSE, and 0 otherwise.
AMEX = 1 if the firm is listed on the AMEX, and 0 otherwise.
NSDQ = 1 if the firm is listed on the NSDQ, and 0 otherwise.
AGE = the age of the offering at the time of the IPO.
INSTIT = percentage of shares held by institutional investors at the end of 
the IPO year obtained from the Thomson Financial 
CDA/Spectrum Institutional (13f) Holdings database.
REPUND = 1 if the lead underwriter is listed as a reputable underwriter in the 
Loughran and Ritter (2004) underwriter rankings list available on 
Jay Ritter’s website, and 0 otherwise.
VC = 1 if the SDC New Issues Database identifies the IPO as having 
venture capital participation, and 0 otherwise.
COV = 1 if the IPO has research coverage on the First Call Historical 
Database, and 0 otherwise.
IPO = 1 if the observation comes from the IPO-year, and 0 otherwise.  
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TABLE 4: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR CONTROL VARIABLES – PART 2 
Pre-SOX
(n = 309)
Post-SOX
(n = 198)
Overall
(n = 507)
AUDITOR 0.95        0.93         0.94         
(1) (1) (0)
[0.22] [0.26] [1.00]
CFO -0.11 0.02         -0.06
(-0.08) (0.06) (-0.01)
[0.23] [0.19] [0.23]
MKTVAL 929.4      1,027.4     967.7       
(351.7) (352.4) (351.7)
[3,561.5] [3,929.3] [3,706.0]
MKTBK 3.11        2.65         2.93         
(2.25) (2.21) (2.22)
[3.16] [2.16] [2.82]
LEV 0.09        0.18         0.13         
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02)
[0.17] [0.30] [0.23]
FCOND -4.36 -4.09 -4.25
(-4.58) (-4.44) (-4.55)
[1.93] [1.76] [1.87]
LOSS 0.72        0.41         0.60         
(1) (0) (1)
[0.45] [0.49] [0.49]
See Table 3 for variable definitions.  The numbers above represent 
means, (medians), and [standard deviations].  
 121
TABLE 5: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR DISCRETIONARY ACCRUALS 
Pre-SOX Post-SOX Overall
1.58        0.09         1.09         
(0.02) (-0.04) (-0.00)
[242] [117] [359]
2.21        0.22         1.12         
(0.23) (-0.03) (0.01)
[67] [81] [148]
Overall 1.71        0.14         
(0.06) (-0.04)
[309] [198]
No Pre-Lockup Expiration 10-K
(PRELOCK = 0)
Pre-Lockup Expiration 10-K
(PRELOCK = 1)
See Table 3 for variable definitions.  Tests of significance for the means (medians) are based 
on t-tests (sign tests).  Bold numbers denote significance at the 5% level or better, one-
tailed.  The numbers in brackets represent the number of observations.
 
 
 
 
TABLE 6: UNIVARIATE TESTS OF DIFFERENCES FOR DISCRETIONARY ACCRUALS 
Diff. p-value Diff. p-value
Pre-SOX vs. Post-SOX -1.57 0.001 -0.09 0.001
Pre-SOX vs. Post-SOX (PRELOCK = 1) -1.99 0.051 -0.26 0.002
Pre-SOX vs. Post-SOX (PRELOCK = 0) -1.48 0.009 -0.06 0.036
t-tests Wilcoxon test
See Table 3 for variable definitions.  Tests for differences in means are based on two-sample t-
tests and non-parametric tests for differences are based on Wilcoxon tests.   Bold numbers 
denote significance at the 10% level or better, two-tailed.
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TABLE 7: MULTIVARIATE MODELS 
Estimate p-value Estimate p-value
INTERCEPT 5.02 0.059 4.14 0.103
SOX -0.84 0.358 -0.87 0.062
PRELOCK 1.11 0.174 1.02 0.210
PRELOCK*SOX -0.59 0.608 -0.91 0.393
AUDITOR -0.62 0.726 -0.76 0.669
CFO -2.74 0.127 -3.55 0.044
SIZE -0.44 0.075 -0.41 0.083
MKTBK -0.03 0.780 -0.01 0.895
LEV -0.20 0.900 0.11 0.944
FCOND 0.08 0.768 -0.01 0.976
LOSS 0.05 0.930 0.09 0.853
Y2001 -1.40 0.009
Y2002 -0.75 0.436
Y2003 -1.88 0.121
Y2004 -0.04 0.973
Joint Test
SOX + PRELOCK*SOX = 0 -1.43 0.284 -1.78 0.080
n
Prob > F
Adjusted R2
507
0.001
See Table 3 for variable definitions.  The dependent variable in this model is 
PADA.   This model is estimated using OLS with White (1980) standard 
errors.  The data set includes financial data from the first 10-K filed by each 
sample firm.  Bold numbers denote significance at the 10% level or better, 
two-tailed.
0.060
507
0.001
0.054
Model 1 Model 2
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TABLE 8: SAMPLE COMPOSITION 
Pre-SOX Post-SOX Diff.
Size
ASSETS 736.40     516.18     -220.21
(125.56) (157.55) (32.00)
SALES 462.82     514.71     51.89
(37.38) (134.51) (97.13)
INCOME -28.37 14.03       42.40      
(-13.86) (2.44) (16.29)
INITMVAL 1,212.00  611.60     -600.40
(472.27) (312.95) (-159.32)
[309] [195]
MKTVAL 929.37     1,027.44  98.07      
(351.68) (352.43) (0.75)
Financing
LEV 0.09        0.18         0.10        
(0.02) (0.03) (0.01)
OFPRC 14.50       14.01       -0.49
(14.00) (14.00) (0.00)
OFFRSIZE 195.68     155.59     -40.09
(79.90) (85.00) (5.10)
UNDPRC 0.49        0.11         -0.38
(0.25) (0.09) (-0.16)
[309] [195]
Operating Performance
SGROW 4.39        0.90         -3.50
(0.90) (0.30) (-0.60)
[299] [194]
INDROS -5.28 -6.16 -0.88
(-0.39) (0.02) (0.41)
INDROA -0.13 -0.01 0.12        
(-0.05) (0.02) (0.07)
Exchange Listing
NYSE 0.10        0.23         0.13        
AMEX 0.02        0.02         0.00        
NSDQ 0.88      0.74       -0.15  
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TABLE 8: CONTINUED 
Pre-SOX Post-SOX Diff.
Other Characteristics
AGE 11.48       18.03        6.55        
(6) (8) (2)
INSTIT 0.29         0.39          0.10        
(0.26) (0.34) (0.09)
[273] [193]
REPUND 0.74         0.77          0.03        
VC 0.66         0.55          -0.11
COV 0.76         0.92          0.17       
See Table 3 for variable definitions.  The numbers above represent means, (medians), 
and [number of observations when different from 309 for pre-SOX offerings and 198 
post-SOX offerings].  Medians are not presented for proportions.  Tests for differences 
in means are based on two-sample t-tests.  Non-parametric tests for differences are 
based on Wilcoxon tests.  Tests for differences in proportions are based on two-
sample tests of proportions.  Bold numbers denote significance at the 10% level or 
better, two-tailed.
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TABLE 9: INDUSTRY COMPOSITION 
SIC Codes Obs Percent Obs Percent
Panel A: Changes in Industry Composition by Industry Group
Chemical Products 28 32 10% 28 14%
Communications 48 13 4% 7 4%
Durable Goods 50 1 0% 6 3%
Eating and Drinking Establishments 58 4 1% 8 4%
Electronic Equipment 36 58 19% 13 7%
Food Products 20 2 1% 1 1%
Health 80 10 3% 2 1%
Oil and Gas 13 5 2% 4 2%
Paper & Paper Products 24-27 2 1% 5 3%
Manufacturing 30-34 4 1% 4 2%
Scientific Instruments 38 35 11% 21 11%
Transportation 37, 39, 40-42, 44, 45 2 1% 11 6%
Retail 53, 54, 56, 57, 59 4 1% 12 6%
Entertainment Services 70, 78, 79 0 0% 6 3%
Financial Services 61, 65 0 0% 6 3%
Computer Equipment & Services 35, 73 110 36% 44 22%
All Others 27 9% 20 10%
Total 309 100% 198 100%
Panel B: Comparison of Old Economy vs. New Economy
Old Economy 174 56% 142 72%
New Economy 135 44% 56 28%
Total 309 100% 198 100%
Pre-SOX Post-SOX
Industry definitions are from Teoh, Wong, and Rao (1998).  The All Others category includes the 
following two-digit SIC codes: 23, 29, 47, 49, 51, 55, 67, 82, and 87.  New Economy firms come 
from the following affected SIC code groups: 35 (3570, 3571, 3572, 3576, and 3577), 36 (3661 and 
3674), 48 (4812 and 4813), 50 (5045), 59 (5961), and 73 (7370, 7371, 7372, and 7373) (Murphy 
2003).  The Old Economy firms include all sample firms not defined as New Economy firms.
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TABLE 10: COMPARISON OF IPOS TO POPULATION 
Estimate Std. Error t-stat p-value
INTERCEPT -0.43 0.26          -1.65 0.098
SOX -0.02 0.02          -1.11 0.269
IPO 0.72       0.11          6.52    0.000
IPO*SOX -1.00 0.33          -3.04 0.002
AUDITOR -0.07 0.06          -1.15 0.250
LISTED 0.47       0.34          1.39    0.165
CFO -0.06 0.01          -4.51 0.000
SIZE 0.20       0.01          13.70  0.000
MKTBK -0.00 0.00          -0.94 0.346
LEV 0.02       0.01          3.67    0.000
FCOND -0.00 0.00          -4.39 0.000
LOSS -0.04 0.03          -1.06 0.288
Joint Test
IPO + IPO*SOX = 0 -0.28 0.371
n
Number of firms
Prob > F
R2 0.015
See Table 3 for variable definitions.  The dependent variable in this model is 
the absolute value of PADA.  This model is estimated using the fixed effects 
specification.  The data set includes all firms with sufficient data between 
2000 and 2004.  Bold numbers denote significance at the 10% level or 
better, two-tailed.
28,728
7,849
0.000
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